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I. INTRODUCTION
The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood
v. Texas' sent shock waves through the academic community with its
holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment2
prohibited the University of Texas Law School from taking account of race
as a factor in its admissions process.' In the course of invalidating certain
procedures employed by the law school, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
Justice Powell's influential opinion in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke,4 which recognized the pursuit of diversity in higher
education as a compelling state interest,5 had never constituted a majority
holding of the Court, had been substantially undermined by recent
precedent, and was inconsistent with basic principles of equal protection.6
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the promotion of racial
diversity in the law school's student body was not a compelling state interest
under the Equal Protection Clause." While acknowledging that providing
a remedy for the present identified effects of past discrimination can be a
compelling state interest, the Court of Appeals concluded that the law school
had failed to establish any such present effects!8 In the absence of a
compelling state interest, the court held that the law school could not
constitutionally take race into account in the admissions process." The
United States Supreme Court denied the state's petition for certiorari."0
Consequently, public universities in Texas are presently precluded from
taking account of race in admissions and, presumably, in financial aid as
well." The same restrictions apparently apply to private institutions within
I. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. The Society of American Law Teachers sponsored an emergency conference on Hopwood
in Chicago on September 20, 1996. The Association of American Law Schools scheduled a workshop
on Hopwood and diversity on January 4, 1997 as part of its annual meeting.
4. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
5. See id. at 314.
6. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944-48.
7. See id. at 948.
8. See id. at 951-55.
9. See id. at 962.
10. See Hopwood v. Texas, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
11. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962. Public universities in Mississippi and Louisiana may continue
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the Fifth Circuit receiving federal aid pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of
1964,2 for both in Bakke," and in subsequent cases, a majority of the
Supreme Court has held that the substantive standard under Title VI is
identical to that of equal protection. 4
Because many institutions of higher learning have relied on the Powell
opinion in Bakke as the blueprint for designing and operating a constitution-
ally acceptable affirmative action admissions process," Hopwood will
have a significant impact in the immediate future in the Fifth Circuit 6 and
may eventually have a similar impact nationally if its reasoning is adopted
by the Supreme Court or by other Courts of Appeal. Predictably, supporters
of racial preferences have been highly critical of the Hopwood decision 7
while opponents of racial preferences have hailed it as a long needed
to rely on race as these states are under federal court orders to remedy the effects of past discrimination.
See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM 97-001 n.13 (1997).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
13. See Bakke, 438 U.S. 265. In Bakke, both Justice Powell, writing for the Court, and Justice
Brennan, writing for four members of the Court, took the position that, with respect to racial
discrimination, Title VI was intended to apply the same standard as the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287 (Powell, J.); id. at 328 (Brennan, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens, writing for four justices, took the position
that Title VI prohibited the use of racial preferences independent of the equal protection standard. See
id. at 415-16 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
14. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 732 n.7 (1992); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service
Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 610-12 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 612-13,
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 635-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The same principle
has been recognized in a more recent case challenging a law school diversity-based admissions program.
See Davis v. Halpern, 768 F. Supp. 968, 974 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
15. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit at 12, Texas v. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (April 30, 1996) (No. 95-1775); BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
BEHIND BAKKE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE SUPREME COURT 154-56 (1988); Akhil Reed Amar
& Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1769 (1996).
16. Enrollment statistics compiled by the State Bar of Texas indicate that minority enrollment
at the law schools of the University of Texas, Southern Methodist University, and Texas Tech University
declined significantly, while minority enrollment at the University of Houston's and Baylor University's
law schools remained about the same. St. Mary's University School of Law experienced a decline in
the enrollment of black students but an increase in the enrollment of Hispanic and Mexican American
students. Declines in minority enrollment at the law schools of Texas Southern University and Texas
Wesleyan University were accompanied by correspondingly large decreases in the size of the entering
classes. No comparative 1996 figures were available from South Texas College of Law. DEPARTMENT
OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS, STATE BAR OF TEXAS, SURVEY OF TEXAS LAW SCHOOLS: THE
RACIAL/ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF FIRST YEAR CLASSES 1996-1997, 1997-1998 (1997) (see Appendix
1). See also Peter Applebome, Minority Law School Enrollment Plunges in California and Texas, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 1997, at AI (Enrollment at California state law schools has also declined following the
passage of a state referendum prohibiting racial preferences in admission.).
17. See Neil Gotanda, Failure of the Color-Blind Vision: Race, Ethnicity, and the California
Civil Rights Initiative, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1135, 1141 (1996); Barbara Bader Aldave, Address
at the Laredo Bar Association Law Day, (May 3, 1996) (transcript on file with the Texas Tech Law
Review); Michael A. Olivas, The Road Not Taken: Hopwood v. State of Texas, BRIEFCASE, Summer
1996, at 16.
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correction.'" A strong dissent from a rehearing en banc 9 and many legal
academics have questioned the institutional propriety of the court's rejection
of Bakke.2"
This article will focus on the Hopwood court's treatment of Bakke and
the diversity issue.2' It will work through relevant aspects of the Supreme
Court's racial preference case law and then analyze Hopwood's treatment of
that law. This article concludes that, while the holding of Bakke is
maddeningly ambiguous, the Fifth Circuit may well have been technically
correct in concluding that Justice Powell's diversity rationale was never a
valid precedent in that it was never supported by a majority of the Court.
This article also concludes that if Bakke was a valid precedent, the Fifth
Circuit was incorrect in determining that it has been significantly under-
mined by subsequent case law, although tension is certainly mounting. This
article will also show that the Powell opinion in Bakke is not inconsistent
with the equal protection principles of individuality, anti-stigmatization, and
the elimination of enduring racialism. Furthermore, it will contend that,
whether or not it ever commanded a majority, the Powell opinion in Bakke
is entitled to a fair amount of judicial respect because it has been openly
relied upon by a large number of universities and professional schools
nationwide without apparent disapproval by the Court. Finally, this article
recommends that the principle of strict scrutiny be combined with a
proposed requirement that institutions that employ race as a diversifying
factor publish relevant information about their admissions processes. Such
a combination should provide adequate judicial and political checks against
the apparent pattern of abuse of the diversity justification.
II. RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS, STRICT SCRUTINY, AND AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION-AN INTRODUCTORY SUMMARY
In Korematsu v. United States,22 the Supreme Court first held that state
classifications based on race are subject to the strict standard of judicial
18. See Kingsley R. Browne, Affirmative Action: Policy-Making By Deception, 22 OHIo N.U.
L. REV. 1291, 1295-96 (1996); Lino A. Graglia, "Affirmative Action, " Past, Present, and Future, 22
OHIO N.U. L. REv. 1207, 1220-22 (1996); John Doggett, UT Can Find Qualified Minorities, DALLAS
MORNING NEws, Apr. 8, 1996, at All.
19. See Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 1996) (Politz, C.J., dissenting).
20. See Gabriel Chin, Bakke to the Wall: The Crisis of Bakkean Diversity, 4 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J., 881, 942-46 (1996); Note, Fifth Circuit Holds That Educational Diversity Is No Longer A
Compelling State Interest, Hopwood v. Texas, 110 HARV. L. REv. 775, 778-79 (1997); Olivas, supra
note 17, at 18; Aldave, supra note 17, at 4.
21. This article will not discuss the court's treatment of the remedial justification in any detail,
see Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948-55, the burden of proof issue on damages, see id. at 955-57, the denial of
injunctive relief, see id. at 957-59, the denial of punitive damages, see id. at 959, nor the denial of a
motion to intervene, see id. at 959-61.
22. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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review under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.23
This has been interpreted to mean that a racial classification will be upheld
only if there is a compelling state interest, the classification is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest, and there are no less discriminatory alterna-
tives.24 Initially, this principle developed in cases involving "invidious"
discrimination; however, the Court has recently made it clear that the strict
standard applies as well to "benign" discrimination such as racial
preferences in affirmative action programs. 25
The ongoing debate regarding the constitutionality of racial preferences
for purposes of affirmative action often focuses on whether the reasons for
being especially suspicious of invidious racial discrimination are equally
applicable to "benign" preferences.26 To a large extent, contemporary
disputes over racial preferences tend to pit two different conceptions of
equal protection in the context of race against each other. The Hopwood
majority, as well as Justice Scalia, 27 essentially rely on the "colorblind
principle," which holds that any consideration of race in governmental
decision making, other than for strictly remedial purposes, is presumptively
unconstitutional. 28  This conclusion may arise for some or all of the
following reasons: such consideration of race is inconsistent with the
original understanding of equal protection,29 is premised on assumptions
of racial inferiority,3" denigrates the individual through the use of irrelevant
and racially based stereotypes,3' is immoral,3 2 is stigmatizing, 33 or leads
to enduring racialism. 34  Arguably, Justice Powell applied a softer version
23. See id. at 216.
24. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-80 n.6 (1986).
25. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227; City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494
(1989) (plurality opinion).
26. Compare Croson, 488 U.S. at 520-21 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that
benign racial preferences deserve the same suspicion as invidious racial discrimination) with id. at 535
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that benign discrimination is permissible).
27. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239.
28. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at941 n.18; see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at239 (Scalia, J., concurring)
("In my view, government can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race
in order to 'make up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction.").
29. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1879); ROBERT H. BORic, THE TEMrnNG
OF AMERICA 82-83 (1990).
30. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
31. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 236; Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
32. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 521 (Kennedy, J., concurring); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975) cited by Justice Powell in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295 n.35.
33. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357, 373-74.
34. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945-48; see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at241 (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that "racial paternalism and its intended consequences
can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other form of discrimination"); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602,612-14 (1970) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that race-based classifications
and unjustified stereotypes promote racial hostility); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493, 495, 497-98, 505-06
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of the colorblind principle in Bakke, concluding that all racial classifications
must be strictly scrutinized, but that the non-remedial interest of diversity
in education could justify a limited use of racial preferences."
A competing approach favored by many academics, and partially
reflected in the opinion of Justice Marshall in Bakke, is known as the "anti-
subordination principle," which holds that the use of race by the govern-
ment is wrong only when it subordinates any racial group. 6
The colorblind principle exalts the rights of the individual, while the
anti-subordination principle emphasizes the rights of racial groups." Both
of these principles usually lead to similar results in cases of classic invidious
discrimination; however, they tend to produce diametrically opposite
conclusions in the context of affirmative action.38  The anti-subordination
(forwarding the idea that classifications based on race may in fact strengthen and solidify the very
stereotypes and notions of racial inferiority they seek to remedy); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (discussing the difficulty of removing the national tendency to judge others based on the color
of their skin); TERRY EASTLAND, ENDING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE CASE FOR COLORBLIND JUSTICE
139-42 (1996) ("[W]e need only consider the history ofour country to see that when government makes
racial distinctions, bad things do follow."); William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme
Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 809 (1979) (concluding that racism will not
disappear if different treatment based on race is tolerated in the practices of government); Charles Fried,
Comment, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104 HARV. L. REV. 107, 11 -
12 (1990) (considering the potential effects of race based programs and classifications).
35. See infra notes .55-69, 94-112 and accompanying text.
36. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 387-88 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part); see also RONALD DwORKtN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 223-39 (1978) (explaining
that only segregation which disadvantages blacks offends their right to be treated as equals); LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-21, at 1515 (2d ed. 1988) ("The core value of this
principle is that all people have equal worth."); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race Conscious-
ness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1114 (1991) ("The view that race discrimination law ought to be about
ending the second-class citizenship of blacks... is at the core of the Civil War Amendments from which
antidiscrimination norms derive."); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race and Equal
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1015 (1986) ("[1]t would be permissible for a state actor to use
facially differentiating policies to redress subordination; it would not be permissible for a state actor to
use facially differentiating policies thatperpetuate subordination."); Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 157 (1986); ("[W]hat is critical, however, is that the state
law or practice aggravates (or perpetuates?) the subordinate position of a specially disadvantaged group.
This is what the Equal Protection Clause prohibits."); Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A
Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1336 (1986) ("Brown and its
progeny ... stand for the proposition that the Constitution prohibits any arrangements imposing racial
subjugation .... "); Cass R Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2453 (1994)
(discussing how formal distinctions between races can produce inequality, particularly a "second-class
status"). See generally Charles L.. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE
LJ. 421 (1960) (considering the history of segregation and the subordination of blacks).
37. See Morris Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1312, 1318, 1326 (1986); Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Bakke: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 67 CAL. L. REV.
69, 84-85 (1979); Fried, supra note 34, at 108-09.
38. Compare Croson, 488 U.S at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that programs based solely
on race will have a "disproportionately beneficial impact" on blacks), with id. at 529 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (contending that programs based on the colorblind approach discourage acts designed to
remedy past discrimination).
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approach has been definitively rejected by the courts. 9 Thus, the judicial
debate, as reflected by Hopwood, has focused on whether the pure
colorblind approach of Justice Scalia or the more moderate colorblind
approach of Justice Powell in Bakke should prevail."0
III. FROM BAKKE TO HOPWOOD
The Hopwood majority based its rejection of Justice Powell's approach
in Bakke on three conclusions: The Powell opinion was never a valid
precedent, it has been undermined by subsequent Supreme Court case law,
and it is inconsistent with accepted equal protection principles."' In order
to evaluate these conclusions, it is necessary to work through the Supreme
Court's affirmative action case law from Bakke to Hopwood in detail and
then to evaluate the Hopwood opinion critically.
A. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
1. Background
During the late Sixties and the early Seventies, many colleges,
universities and professional schools adopted programs to increase the
number of minority students admitted." Many of these programs involved
"affirmative action" in perhaps the most literal and traditional sense:
increased recruiting efforts at minority schools and in minority communities
along with summer tutorial programs for incoming minority students. 3
However, some institutions also adopted policies which gave preference in
the admissions process to members of certain minority groups.44 An initial
challenge to such a policy was brought to the United States Supreme Court
in the case of DeFunis v. Odegaard; however, it was dismissed as moot.
45
Four years later, the Court confronted the issue on the merits in Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke.4
Alan Bakke sued the University of California at Davis under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 after having twice been denied admission to the medical
39. See infra notes 156-57, 189-90, 208-15 and accompanying text.
40. See Aleinikoff, supra note 36, at 1078-89.
41. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944-46 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581.
42. See EASTLAND, supra note 34, at 58-62.
43. See Anthony Scanlon, The History and Culture of Affirmative Action, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REv.
343, 351-52 (1988); Nicholas Lemann, Taking Affirmative Action Apart, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June I1,
1995, at 36, 40-43, 52.
44. See id.
45. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
46. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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school.47 The California Supreme Court invalidated the school's admis-
sions program, which had reserved sixteen of one hundred seats in the
entering class for applicants who were " 'economically and/or educationally
disadvantaged' " and who were members of specified minority groups.4"
A five member majority of the United States Supreme Court affirmed in
part, holding that an explicit set-aside based on race was illegal,49 while a
different five member majority held that an educational institution could
make some limited use of race in the admissions process.5" Justice Powell
linked these two holdings together." Justice Stevens and three concurring
justices (the Stevens four) concluded that a flat racial set-aside violated Title
VI, 2 while Justice Powell reached the same result based on equal protec-
tion." Justice Brennan, plus three concurring justices (the Brennan four),
concluded that even a flat racial set-aside could be legal under both Title VI
and the Equal Protection Clause. 4 The Brennan Four joined with Justice
Powell, who concluded that the use of race as one factor in a "competitive"
admissions process could satisfy equal protection, for an apparent holding
that institutions could use race to a limited extent in the admissions
process." As was immediately recognized, Justice Powell's lengthy
opinion is the key to Bakke, and as such, it has been regarded as the
cornerstone of affirmative action in university admissions ever since. 6
2. The Standard of Review
Justice Powell took the position that when the state uses race as a factor
in its decision making process, even for purportedly benevolent purposes,
it must satisfy the strict standard of review. 7 He set forth several reasons
for this conclusion. Focusing on the text of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Justice Powell noted that it is written in individualistic language prohibiting
the state from denying equal protection of the laws "to all persons" without
47. See id. at 277. See also SCHWARTZ, supra note 15 (providing a detailed history of Bakke).
48. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 274-75. Black, Chicano, Asian, and American Indian applicants qualified
for consideration under the program. See id. at 274.
49. See id. at 269-73. Justice Powell, who authored the Court's opinion, Chief Justice Burger,
and Justices Stevens, Rehnquist and Stewart formed the majority. See id. at 27 1.
50. See id. at 269-72. Justice Powell and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun
formed this majority. See id. at 272.
5I. See id. at 269-324 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
52. See id. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
53. See id. at 319-20 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
54. See id. at 324-25 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
55. See id. at 272 (Powell, J., plurality opinion); id. at 324-25 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
56. See Vincent Blasi, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a Theory?, 67 CAL.
L. REV. 21 (1979); Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Bakke: A Constitutional Analysis, 67 CAL. L. REV. 69 (1979).
57. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287-99 (1978).
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reference to membership in a particular racial group." At the outset, he
rejected the process oriented approach to strict scrutiny derived from the
famous Carolene Products footnote four,5 9 which suggests that race is a
suspect classification only when it disadvantages " 'discrete and insular
minorit[ies].' "' Rather, Justice Powell quoted Hirabayashi v. United
States for the proposition that " '[d]istinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people.
" , 61
Turning to history, Justice Powell acknowledged that the Equal
Protection Clause originated in an effort to provide protection for recently
freed slaves; however, he observed that the Court's precedent had long since
extended its application to any form of racial or ancestral discrimination."2
Moreover, he argued that an attempt to apply heightened review to only
selected minority groups would be both unprincipled and unadministratable
given the racial and ethnic diversity of modem America.63
Justice Powell then explained that racial preferences raise serious
considerations of justice because they may not be so benign, may reinforce
negative racial stereotypes, and may impose an unfair burden on innocent
individuals." He also noted that judicial deference to racial preferences
could undermine principled constitutional decision making by placing too
much reliance on transitory political calculations.65 In response to Justice
Brennan, Justice Powell rejected the notion that the concept of stigma is
crucial to the application of strict scrutiny on the grounds that, because
stigma has no textual support, the concept could not be applied in a
predictable or principled manner."
Thus, Justice Powell based his case for strict scrutiny of all racial
classifications on a highly individualistic conception of equal protection. 67
In deriving this principle, Justice Powell relied heavily on text, precedent,
administrability, fairness, and the constraints of principled constitutional
decision making. 68  Ultimately, Justice Powell concluded that the risk of
constitutional harm from state reliance on race as a classifying factor was
58. See id. at 293 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)).
59. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Professor Ely
argued in a much cited article that the process oriented approach was appropriate and that it should result
in less than strict review of racial preferences where the majority places burdens on itself. See John Hart
Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CMI. L. REv. 723 (1974).
60. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290 (quoting Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4).
61. Id. at 290-91 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
62. See id. at 291-96.
63. See id. at 295-99.
64. See id. at 298.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 294 n.34.
67. See id. at 289-91.
68. See id. at 291-99.
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simply too severe to justify a more deferential judicial approach regardless
of benevolent intentions.69
By way of contrast, Justice Brennan, writing for three other justices,
argued vigorously that a somewhat less demanding intermediate standard of
review should suffice to review benign racial preferences.70 At the outset,
Justice Brennan asserted that the principle propounded by Justice Powell had
never been adopted by a majority of the Court.7 Unlike Justice Powell's
individualistic focus, Justice Brennan considered whites as a group'and noted
that the white race had not been subject to" 'a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness.' "72
In reliance on a variety of equal protection precedents, Justice Brennan
concluded that racial preferences in the admissions process that are not
irrelevant to legitimate governmental purposes do not stigmatize disadvan-
taged black applicants as inferior.73  Nevertheless, Justice Brennan
concluded that an intermediate standard of review, as opposed to a mere
rationality standard, was warranted in view of the risk of stigma and the
potential unfairness of disadvantaging an individual based on an immutable
characteristic such as race."4 Thus, it appears that Justice Brennan tended
to focus on group oriented considerations in rejecting strict scrutiny and
individualistic oriented concerns in preferring an intermediate standard.
The debate between Justice Powell and Justice Brennan on the standard
of review provides an abridged version of the debate which preceded
Bakke." This debate continues to this day over the correct approach under
the Equal Protection Clause regarding state-sanctioned racial preferences.
Although Justice Powell wrote only for himself while Justice Brennan wrote
for four justices, the Court has since adopted Justice Powell's approach with
respect to the appropriate standard of review."6
3. The State Justifications
The state offered the following four justifications for the racial set-aside:
1) increasing the number of historically disfavored minorities in the medical
school and the medical profession, 2) countering the effects of societal
69. See id. at 319-20.
70. See id. at 361-62 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
71. See id. at 355-56.
72. Id. at 357 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
73. See id. at 357-58.
74. See id. at 358-62.
75. See id. at 287-99 (Powell, J.); id. at 356-62 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
76. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (plurality opinion);
id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also infra notes 138-57 and accompanying text (discussing in
detail the Court's adoption of Justice Powell's approach).
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discrimination, 3) increasing the number of physicians who will practice in
currently underserved communities, and 4) obtaining the educational benefits
which flow from an ethnically diverse student body.77 Although this
article focuses almost exclusively on the diversity justification, some account
of the other rationales will prove useful.
a. Increasing Minority Representation
Justice Powell summarily dismissed the first justification, increasing the
number of historically disfavored minorities in medical school and the
medical profession, as an invalid purpose in and of itself.78 Thus, admis-
sions procedures that purportedly rely on the diversity justification and in
fact attempt to simply bolster the number of minority students or graduates
for reasons of social policy can claim no support whatsoever from the
Powell opinion in Bakke.
b. Countering the Effects of Societal Discrimination
Justice Powell recognized the significance of the state interest in
providing a remedy for past discrimination.79 He concluded, however, that
the state interest could only be compelling if a state institution, with the
requisite competence and authority, made findings in the record that the
racial preference program was adopted in response to identified discrimina-
tion."' In addition, Justice Powell found that the Regents of the University
of California had not made such findings and were not competent to do so
in the absence of an express delegation of authority.8 '
Justice Powell's institutional competence approach was novel. This
approach may have been prompted by an article published three years prior
to Bakke by Dean Sandalow of the University of Michigan Law School that
made a similar argument.82 The article is sensitive to a familiar complaint
against racial preference programs: that they are usually adopted administra-
tively, without publicity or debate, by bodies such as university faculties.8 3
These faculties are not politically accountable and have little understanding
of the costs of these programs or sympathy with the individuals most likely
to bear those costs."
77. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306 (1978).
78. See id. at 307.
79. See id. at 307.
80. See id. at 309.
81. See id.
82. See Terrance Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility
and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 695 (1975).
83. See id.
84. See id. at 695-96; Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1839, 1867-68
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Justice Brennan vigorously disagreed, and argued that the school should
be allowed to adopt a racial set-aside program as a remedy for societal
discrimination. 5 He further asserted that this adoption should be allowed
if the school could establish that "there is a sound basis for concluding that
minority underrepresentation is substantial and chronic, . . . [and] the
handicap of past discrimination is impeding access of minorities to the..
. school," the program does not stigmatize any discrete group or individual,
and it is reasonably used in light of its objectives. 6 In an extended
discussion, Justice Brennan attempted to show that each of these elements
was satisfied by Cal-Davis' admissions program." He contended that the
state need not establish that it had discriminated on the basis of race and
could thus adopt a race-conscious admissions program. Justice Brennan
concluded, however, that a race-conscious admissions program could only
be adopted if there was a sufficient basis for concluding that underrepresen-
tation of targeted minorities was attributable to what is often referred to as
"societal discrimination." '89 Justice Marshall added a passionate dissent
urging that a group oriented remedial approach was quite appropriate in
view of the group based focus of our history of racial discrimination.9 °
In a series of cases since Bakke, the Supreme Court has bolstered the
approach of Justice Powell and rejected that of Justice Brennan.9 These
cases addressed the appropriate standards for assessing the constitutionality
of race-conscious remedial programs, at least in the contexts of employment
and government contracting. 92 The question of just how far the Court has
gone in constraining the remedial approach, though not the focus of this
article, was a significant issue in Hopwood.93
c. Improving the Delivery of Health Care Services to
Underserved Communities
Justice Powell recognized that improving the delivery of health care
services to underserved communities could be a compelling state interest.
94
(1996); Chin, supra note 20, at 934; Van Alstyne, supra note 34, at 801-02.
85. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 362, 373-74.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 362-78.
88. See id. at 369.
89. See id. at 370-73.
90. See id. at 387 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91. See infra Part ilI.B.I-5.
92. See infra Part iI1.B.l-5.
93. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 948-55 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
94. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310-11.
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However, he concluded that there was no evidence that a racial preference
would promote this interest any better than race-neutral alternatives."
d Diversity of the Student Body
For Justice Powell, the case turned on the final justification-the
promotion of the educational benefits derived from a diverse student
body.96 Justice Powell readily concluded that the right of the university to
select a student body best able to promote a robust and effective exchange
of ideas is a compelling state interest.97 He bolstered this conclusion with
the observation that the selection of the student body is an essential element
of academic freedom that in turn is a "special concern" of the First
Amendment. 8 Nevertheless, Justice Powell determined that if the state
chose to rely on race as a means of furthering diversity, it must do so in a
way that could satisfy strict scrutiny.9 9 Justice Powell proceeded to reject
Cal-Davis' set-aside program on the ground that it promoted racial diversity
but not the "genuine" diversity that furthers a compelling interest.'00
Justice Powell set forth the approach of Harvard College as a model of
the broad based, multi-factored, genuine diversity that finds support in the
First Amendment and allows for the consideration of race as one of many
"pluses" in the file.'0 ' According to Justice Powell, the constitutional
virtues of the "Harvard plan" were that it preserved individual competition
between applicants and permitted the consideration of a wide array of
seemingly relevant factors."2 Indeed, he concluded that "[t]he denial to
respondent of this right to individualized consideration without regard to his
race is the principal evil of petitioner's special admissions program." ' 03
Justice Powell also emphasized that a set-aside was constitutionally
problematic because it "will be viewed as inherently unfair by the public
generally as well as by applicants."'" Both of these considerations
dovetailed nicely with his earlier discussion of the individualistic character
of equal protection.'05
Finally, Justice Powell rejected the suggestion that a "plus-in-the-file"
approach would merely serve as a convenient cover for quotas and set-
95. See id.
96. See id. at 311-12.
97. See id. at 311-15.
98. See id. at 312.
99. See id. at 290-91.
100. See id. at 315.
1Oi. See id. at 316.1S.
102. See id. at 317.
103. Id. at 318 n.52.
104. Id. at 319 n.53.
105. See id. at 299.
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asides."0 6 He stated that the Court would assume good faith on the part of
educational institutions and that such programs could be challenged if there
was reason to believe that schools were not pursuing an individualized case-
by-case approach.1
0 7
Justice Brennan did not address the diversity rationale in any detail.'08
He did note, however, that any racial preference, including a Harvard type
plus-in-the-file, would all but inevitably mean that race made the difference
between admittance and rejection in some cases." This is beyond
argument; however, Justice Brennan apparently believed that Justice
Powell's model of individualized consideration tended to obscure this fact.
Justice Brennan also argued that the Harvard plan and the Cal-Davis plan
were quite similar in that Harvard also had a clear minority admissions goal
that it was attempting to meet."0 Consequently, the only advantage of the
Harvard plan was that its use of race as a decisive factor was more
concealed from the public."' Perhaps most significantly, Justice Brennan
refused to provide an unqualified endorsement of the diversity rationale.
Instead he conceded that "a plan like the 'Harvard' plan.., is constitution-
al . . . at least so long as the use of race to achieve an integrated student
body is necessitated by the lingering effects of past discrimination." '2
B. From Fullilove to Adarand
1. Fullilove v. Klutznick
Since Bakke, the Supreme Court's racial preference precedent has
developed primarily in the context of set-asides for minority contractors in
government contracting programs." 3  In Fullilove v. Klutznick,"4 the
Court rejected a facial challenge to a congressional program which required
that, absent a waiver, ten percent of the federal funds allocated to state and
local governments for the construction of public works be used to hire
minority owned businesses."' In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the
Court easily sustained the program under a highly deferential standard of
106. See id. at 318.
107. See id. at 318-19 n.53.
108. See id. at 326 n.l.
109. See id. at 378.
110. See id. at 379.
111. See id.
112. Id. at 326 n.l.
113. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547 (1990); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
114. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
115. See id. at 492.
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review. '6 Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion contending that the
program could satisfy the strict standard of review which he applied in
Bakke." '7 Justice Stevens wrote a lengthy dissent contending that the
program could not possibly meet the strict standard of review if applied
honestly." 8 At the very least, Fullilove appeared to mean that the Court
would be more deferential to congressionally mandated racial preference
programs than to those adopted by state institutions." 9
2. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education
In the 1986 case of Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, ° a
sharply divided Court invalidated a portion of a collective bargaining
agreement negotiated by the Jackson, Michigan Board of Education and its
teachers union.' The agreement provided that, despite seniority, minority
teachers would not be laid off in greater proportion than their existing
percentage in the school system.' Writing for a plurality, Justice Powell
rejected the argument that providing "role models" for minority students
could justify the racially conscious layoff plan.' The role model theory
was based on societal discrimination rather than specific and identified
discrimination; hence the plan had "no logical stopping point."' 24
Additionally, such a plan could not be a narrowly tailored means capable of
satisfying strict scrutiny.2 5 Justice Powell noted that the plan could not be
defended as a narrowly tailored remedy because the layoff percentages were
tied to the disparity between minority students and teachers rather than to
any measure of past discrimination against teachers.2 6 Justice Powell
further concluded that correcting societal discrimination could not vindicate
a racial classification,' 27 and that, because of the burden imposed on
innocent employees, a racially preferential layoff plan could not be the least
discriminatory means of accomplishing any valid state goal.
28
116. See id. at 473, 490.
117. See id. at 496 (Powell, J., concurring).
118. See id. at 532 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. Compare Fullilove 418 U.S. at448 (reviewing congressionally mandated racial preferences),
witih Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 245, 265 (reviewing racial preferences mandated
by the State of California).
120. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
121. See id. at 275-76, 283-84.
122. See id. at 267.
123. See id. at 275-76.
124. Id. at 275.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 274.
128. See id. at 283-84.
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In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed that neither remedial
gains for past discrimination nor the role model theory were compelling
state interests. 29  However, she made a point of noting that "[t]he goal
of providing 'role models' . . . should not be confused with the very
different goal of promoting racial diversity among the faculty."'"3 Justice
White concurred in the judgment in a brief opinion summarily rejecting all
of the state's justifications. 3 ' Justice Marshall wrote a lengthy dissent,
joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, maintaining that the plan should
be sustained on remedial grounds. 3 2  Justice Stevens submitted a dissent
defending the role model theory as a constitutionally valid inclusionary
justification for a race-conscious plan.'33
Wygant, even more than Bakke, was a difficult decision to piece together
in view of the absence of a clear majority rationale.'34 It is of some
significance to the issue of diversity in higher education that only one
Justice, Justice Stevens, showed any enthusiasm for the forward-looking role
model justification. 3  Justice Stevens' dissent bore some theoretical
similarities to Bakke's diversity approach,'36 despite Justice O'Connor's
attempt to distinguish them."37
3. City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.
A clear majority of the Supreme Court finally began to coalesce around
certain principles for analyzing race-conscious preference programs in City
of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.' 3  In Croson, the Court invalidated a
program adopted by the Richmond, Virginia City Council which required
129. See id. at 288 & n.*, 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 288 n.* (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor seemed to differ with Justice
Powell on the need for contemporaneous fact findings of discrimination as a predicate for a race-
conscious remedial plan on the ground that it would discourage voluntary compliance. See id. at 291
(O'Connor, J., concurring). She concurred in the judgment, however, on the ground that the school
board and the lower courts failed to rely on the provision of a remedy for the state's own discrimination
as opposed to societal discrimination. See id. at 293 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor was
not prepared to conclude that a racially conscious layoff plan could never satisfy strict scrutiny. See id.
at 293-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
131. See id. at 294-95 (White, J., concurring).
132. See id. at 303-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
133. See id. at 315-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. See id. at 269. Joining Justice Powell were ChiefJustic Burger and Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor. See id.
135. See id. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. Compare id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that a school board might legitimately find
value in an integrated faculty being able to provide benefits to a student body), with Bakke, 438 U.S. at
312-20 (1978) (arguing race might be legitimately taken into account in college admissions to promote
diversity in the interchange of ideas).
137. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
138. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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prime contractors on city construction contracts to subcontract at least thirty
percent of the amount of the contract to businesses owned by specified
minorities. 39 For the first time, a majority of the Court agreed that a benign
racial classification adopted by a state or its subdivisions, such as this
subcontracting set-aside, must satisfy a strict standard of review. 4"
In a portion of the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White and Kennedy, Justice O'Connor emphasized the
individualistic nature of equal protection rights.'4' Justice O'Connor
pointed out that strict review is essential to determine whether a classifica-
tion is in fact benign rather than invidious, and to ensure that the classifica-
tion does not stigmatize the racial groups affected.'42 Justice O'Connor
relied quite heavily on Justice Powell's opinions in Bakke and Wygant as
support for the decision to apply strict scrutiny.' While not joining the
O'Connor opinion, Justice Scalia added a concurrence agreeing that strict
scrutiny must apply to all governmental racial classifications.'"
Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice O'Connor concluded that,
like the role model theory in Wygant, the Richmond plan could not survive
constitutional scrutiny because it relied on generalized assertions of
"societal discrimination" rather than on findings of "identified discrimina-
tion." 45 Moreover, the city failed to establish that the small amount of
public funding received by minority contractors was attributable to past or
present discrimination.'46 Consequently, the Court held that the City of
Richmond had not shown a compelling state interest. 47 Relying on the
Powell opinion in Bakke, 48 the Court concluded that state adoption of
racial preferences, based on nothing more than conclusions about societal
discrimination, would result in "a mosaic of shifting preferences based on
inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs. '14' The Court also noted
that, while the record was inadequate to permit full consideration of the
tailoring of the remedy, the city erred by failing to consider race-neutral
means as well as by relying on set-asides instead of on individual assess-
ment. 5 o
139. See id. at 478.
140. See id. at 493-94; 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
141. See id. at 493.
142. See id. at 493-94.
143. See id. at 493-98.
144. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 499.
146. See id. at 499-506.
147. See id. at 505.
148. See id. at 506.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 507-08.
1998]
TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment and in parts of the opinion,
emphasizing, as in Wygant, that the Court should be more favorably
disposed to forward-looking rather than backward-looking racial classifica-
tions. " ' Justice Kennedy concurred in most of Justice O'Connor's opinion,
noting that "[t]he moral imperative of racial neutrality is the driving force
of the Equal Protection Clause."'5 2 Justice Scalia concurred in the
judgment, urging the Court to reject group rights thinking and adopt a strict
colorblind approach.'53 He would permit a race-conscious remedy only
when the state acted "to eliminate their own maintenance of a system of
unlawful racial classification."' 54  Justice Marshall, joined by Justices
Brennan and Blackmun, submitted a lengthy dissent challenging the Court's
approach to remedial racial preferences by arguing that the Richmond
program clearly satisfied strict scrutiny.'"
Croson is a watershed case on racial preferences. It is the first case in
which a majority of the Court applied strict scrutiny to a benign racial
preference.'56 It is also noteworthy because of the commitment by a clear
majority of the Court to the individualistic antidiscrimination approach
coupled with an equally firm rejection of the group rights oriented anti-
subordination theory.'" The implications of these determinations extend
well beyond the context of public contracting set-asides.
4. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC
In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,' s the Court sustained the
constitutional validity of two FCC initiated racial preferences: one that gave
minority owned businesses an advantage in a comparative license proceed-
ing, and another that allowed licensees who were on the verge of losing
their licenses to sell to minority owned businesses at distress sale prices.'
The preference programs, endorsed by Congress, 60 were intended to
increase programming oriented toward minorities by increasing minority
ownership of broadcast licenses.' 6 '
151. See id. at 511 (Stevens, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
153. See id. at 526-28.
154. Id. at 524.
155. See id. at 528-61.
156. See id. at 493-94; 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
157. See id.
158. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
159. See id. at 552.
160. Congress expressed its approval of the preference policies by prohibiting the FCC from
spending appropriated funds to repeal them. See id. at 560.
161. See id. at 554-58.
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Relying on Fullilove, the Court deferred to Congress by applying an
intermediate, rather than a strict, standard of review to the preferences."'
In direct reliance on the Powell opinion in Bakke, Justice Brennan concluded
that enhancing broadcast diversity was an important state interest. 63 After
a lengthy consideration of the history of FCC efforts to increase broadcast
diversity, the Court concluded that these programs were substantially related
to the achievement of their ends. 64 In response to the dissent's argument
that the preferences were based on impermissible stereotypes, the majority
noted the FCC's conclusion that, in the aggregate, minority owners were
more likely to contribute to greater programming diversity.' 65  This
conclusion was quite similar to Justice Powell's assumption in Bakke that
the admission of more minority students would contribute to a broader
interchange of ideas. 66 The Court also concluded that the impact of these
relatively limited policies on non-minorities was slight. 67 Justice Stevens
added a short concurrence pointing out that the Court's decision clearly
rejected the notion that racial classifications could only be legitimately
employed by the government for remedial purposes.
68
Justice O'Connor wrote a lengthy and potentially significant dissent
joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy. 69  She began by
emphasizing the individualistic nature of the equality principle with respect
to race and warned that the use of racial classifications "endorse[s] race-
based reasoning and the conception of a Nation divided into racial blocs,




Consequently, Justice O'Connor argued that only the strict standard of
review was appropriate.' 7 ' She then asserted that providing a remedy for
past discrimination was the only previously recognized compelling state
interest capable of supporting a racial classification and that increasing
diversity in broadcasting was clearly not such an interest.7 " As will be
developed in greater detail later,'" Justice O'Connor argued that the
162. See id. at 563-65 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980)).
163. See id. at 567-68 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-13 (1978)).
164. See id. at 569.
165. See id. at 579-80.
166. See id. The Court discussed a variety of empirical studies the FCC considered which
purported to bolster this conclusion. See id. at 580-83.
167. See id. at 596-97.
168. See id. at 601.
169. See id. at 602.
170. Id. at 602-03. Justice O'Connor began her opinion with the observation that: "At the heart
of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must
treat citizens 'as individuals, not "as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national
class."' " Id. at 602 (quoting Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred
Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083 (1983)).
171. See id. at 603.
172. See id. at 612.
173. See infra notes 312-37 and accompanying text.
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interest in broadcast diversity could be easily abused and that it improperly
equated race with behavior."'
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia,
compared the majority's analytical approach to the Court's rationale in
Plessy v. Ferguson."" Justice Kennedy argued that an interest "so trivial
as 'broadcast diversity' " could never justify a racial preference.' 76
Justice Kennedy also asserted that the majority avoided confronting the
stigmatic harm that a racial preference could inflict on both the advantaged
and disadvantaged classes.'
Although Metro Broadcasting was overruled by Adarand,"'a it remains
an important case because of the four dissenting justices' assessment of the
diversity interest in the broadcasting context. 79  For that reason, Metro
Broadcasting must be carefully considered in evaluating the continuing
validity of Justice Powell's diversity justification in the educational context
of Bakke.180
5. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, a majority of the Court, in an
opinion written by Justice O'Connor, held that a strict standard of review
applied to a complex, federally funded construction program.' This
program granted a preference to subcontracting firms controlled by "socially
and economically disadvantaged individuals," whereby members of
specified minority groups were presumed to be such individuals.' 2 Justice
O'Connor concluded that the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence could
be summarized by three principles: 1) skepticism, 2) consistency, and 3)
congruence.' 3 Skepticism requires that racial classifications be subjected to
strict scrutiny.' 4 Consistency demands this result whether the classifica-
tions are purportedly benign or invidious.' 5 Finally, congruence provides
that the same standard must apply to state or federal action. 6 In defense
of these principles, the Court quoted from the portion of Justice Powell's
174. See Metro Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. at 614-15, 619-20.
175. See id. at 631-38 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
176. Id. at 633.
177. See id. at 637.
178. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 231-35 (1995).
179. See Metro Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. at 602 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
180. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
181. 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). Justice O'Connor's opinion constituted a majority only to the
extent that it was consistent with Justice Scalia's concurring opinion. See id. at 204.
182. See id. at 205, 207.
183. See id. at 223-24.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 224.
186. See id.
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Bakke opinion which discussed the individualistic character of equal
protection principles with respect to racial classifications.' 87 In order to
adopt these principles, especially congruence, the majority found it necessary
to overrule Metro Broadcasting because that case applied an intermediate
standard of review to a racial preference.'
Responding to Justice Stevens' dissent, Justice O'Connor asserted that
good intentions by the government should not be sufficient to lower the
standard of review for a racial preference because even a well intentioned
preference can exacerbate racial prejudice. 9 Rather, the Court main-
tained that an individual disadvantaged by race has suffered an injury which
may or may not be justifiable in a particular case."9 Justice O'Connor
sought "to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal
in fact,' " suggesting instead that racial classifications can sometimes be sus-
tained.'9 ' The Court remanded the case for reconsideration under the strict
standard of review.
192
Justice Scalia submitted a short concurrence which was important
because he provided the fifth vote for the Court's decision. 93 Indeed, the
syllabus to Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court states that her opinion
(with the exception of the stare decisis section III-C) "is for the Court
except insofar as it might be inconsistent with the views expressed in Justice
Scalia's concurrence.' 94  Justice Scalia reiterated his strong colorblind
approach to equal protection, noting that "government can never have a
'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make
up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction."' 95  He
concluded that "under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either
a creditor or debtor race."' 96 Justice Thomas wrote a short concurrence
taking issue with what he characterized as the dissenting Justices' "racial
paternalism exception" to equal protection.'9 He asserted that "[s]o-
called 'benign' discrimination teaches many that, because of chronic and
187. See id. at 180 (referring to Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299
(1978)).
188. See id. at 227. In section Ill-C of her opinion, joined only by Justice Kennedy, Justice
O'Connor explained that overruling Metro Broadcasting was consistent with stare decisis because Metro
had sharply departed from existing precedent See id. at 231-35.
189. See id. at 228-29.
190. See id. at 228.
191. Id. at 237 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring)).
192. See id. at 237.
193. See id. at 239.
194. Id. at 200.
195. Id. at 239 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring)).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them
without their patronizing indulgence."' 98
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented, criticizing the
Court's analytical approach as well as its results.'" Justice Stevens
contended that the Court's principle of consistency "would disregard the
difference between a 'No Trespassing' sign and a welcoming mat."200 He
asserted that it was not difficult to distinguish between good and bad
intentions in racial classifications.2 ' Justice Stevens' dissent also argued
that the principle of congruence was inconsistent with precedent and
therefore misguided.2 2 Justice Stevens interpreted the Court's overruling
of Metro Broadcasting as merely a rejection of the application of the
intermediate standard of review and by no means a denial of the significance
of the state interest in promoting diversity.20 3 Justices Souter and Gins-
burg also submitted short dissents."
6. The Minority-Majority Redistricting Cases
In a series of recent cases, the Supreme Court addressed the constitu-
tionality of state legislative redistricting plans.20 5 These redistricting plans
involved strangely shaped voting districts designed to ensure that members
of a particular racial minority group constituted a majority of the voters in
those districts.0 The Court applied a strict standard of review when it
found that race was the predominant factor in creating districts.07 These
cases are quite different factually from the racial preference in education and
contracting cases and hence do not warrant detailed consideration.
However, these cases are of some significance in that, like the racial
preference cases, they place strong emphasis on the individualistic character
of equal protection rights and minimize the significance of group oriented
theories.208 This focus was especially telling in the voting rights context
198. Id. at 241.
199. See id. at 242-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 245.
201. See id. at 246.
202. See id. at 259.
203. See id. at 258.
204. See id. at 264-71 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 271-76 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
205. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996) (Shaw
II); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
206. See e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996) (finding the redistricting plan at issue an
unconstitutional violation of the Equal Protection Clause and not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest).
207. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1953 (citing Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488).
208. See Shaw ll, 116 S. Ct. at 1902; see also Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486 ("At the heart of the
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat
citizens 'as individuals, not "as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class."')
(quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
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because almost by definition, electoral districting involved "associational"
or group-oriented considerations."
The Court conceded that some degree of race consciousness in electoral
districting was all but inevitable and did not automatically lead to strict
scrutiny."' However, the Court determined that a preoccupation with race
in districting, to the virtual exclusion of other traditionally relevant factors,
was constitutionally suspect."' Such a preoccupation appeared to proceed
on the stereotypical assumption that members of racial groups "think alike,
share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the
polls." '2t 2  Additionally, redistricting encouraged greater racial balkaniza-
tion in the political process." 3 These redistricting cases emphasized that
the Court has firmly settled on an individualistic anti-discrimination model
as opposed to a group oriented anti-subordination model for evaluating race-
conscious governmental decision making." 4 The Court utilizes this model
across the board and not simply in the contracting and employment
contexts. 2 " These various lines of cases will tend to reinforce each other.
C. Hopwood
In the early seventies, the University of Texas School of Law adopted
various preferential policies to increase the number of black and Mexican-
American students admitted2 1 6  By 1992, it had developed a weighted
index of applicant grade points and LSAT scores for classifying applicants
as "presumptive admit," "discretionary zone," and "presumptive
deny." 2" The law school admitted the vast majority of applicants in the
presumptive admit category but downgraded some into the discretionary
zone. 2 8 Most of the applicants in the presumptive deny category were
denied admission, although some were upgraded into the discretionary
zone. The applications in the discretionary zone received more exten-
209. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1999-2000 (Souter, J., dissenting).
210. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647.
211. See id.
212. Id.
213. See id. at 648-49.
214. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486.
215. See id.
216. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 937 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
Prior to the adoption of the processes taking race into account, the law school had few if any black
students. See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 558 (W.D. Tex. 1994). The district court opinion
provided a lengthy history of the evolution of the use of racial preferences in the law school's admissions
process. See id. at 557-63. The racial preferences were designed in part to help the school achieve
targets of 10% Mexican-American students and 5% black students established by the Office of Civil
Rights in negotiation with the University of Texas. See id. at 563.
217. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935.
218. See id. at 935-36.
219. See id. at 936.
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sive consideration as admissions personnel took account of additional
characteristics to include the following: the strength of the undergraduate
institution, the applicant's major, grade trends, background, and work
experience before rendering a final decision.220
To help ensure the admittance of a representative number of blacks and
Mexican-Americans, the law school adopted different presumptive admit and
presumptive deny index scores for non-minorities,22' blacks, and Mexican-
Americans.222 Indeed, the presumptive deny index score for non-minority
students was higher than the presumptive admit score for black and
Mexican-American applicants 2 23 Moreover, applications from black and
Mexican-American students in the discretionary zone were reviewed by a
minority subcommittee rather than one of the ordinary discretionary zone
subcommittees.224 The decisions of these minority subcommittees were
subject to review by the admissions committee as a whole but were
"virtually final." 22 The school also maintained separate waiting lists for
non-minorities, blacks, and Mexican-Americans. 26  As a result of these
policies, black and Mexican-American applicants were frequently admitted
with index scores lower than those of many non-minority applicants denied
admission.22" The law school continually readjusted its index range to
achieve the desired racial mix.228
Four non-minority applicants who had been denied admission to the law
school in 1992 filed suit alleging that the racial preferences utilized by the
law school violated their constitutional rights to equal protection of the laws
under the Fourteenth Amendment.229 Prior to trial, the law school
abandoned the racially separate presumptive admit and presumptive deny
lines, as well as the separate subcommittees for minority and non-minority
applicants.2 3' Applying the strict standard of review, the district court
held that the discontinued practices of employing separate subcommittees
and separate presumptive denial lines violated equal protection.23 ' The
220. See id. at 935.
221. Non-minority is a term of art used by the Court of Appeals to indicate all applicants not
covered by the preference plan, which was everyone other than blacks and Mexican-Americans. See id.
at 936.
222. See id. at 935-36.
223. See id. at 936. In 1992, the presumptive deny score for non-minorities was 192 while the
presumptive admit score for blacks and Mexican-Americans was 189. The presumptive deny score for
minorities was 179. See id.
224. See id. at 937.
225. Id. at 937.
226. See id. at 938.
227. See id. at 937. In 1992, the first year class contained 41 blacks and 55 Mexican-American
students constituting 8% and 10.7% of the class. See id.
228. See id. at 937 n.l0.
229. See id. at 938.
230. See id. at 939 n.16.
231. See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 576 n.I (W.D. Tex. 1994). The district court
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employment of separate considerations precluded the individualized
consideration of applicants required by Justice Powell in Bakke."'
However, pursuant to the Powell opinion in Bakke, the school could
continue to use race as a factor in the admissions process. 3 The district
court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove that they would have been
admitted under a constitutional admissions process.234 In so finding, it
declined to issue an injunction ordering their admission or to award
damages. 35 However, the district court'did order the plaintiffs be given the
opportunity to reapply without paying any additional fee.236 The plaintiffs
appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
Like the district court, the court of appeals employed the strict standard
of review to evaluate the law school's use of racial preferences."3 '
However, it rejected the district court's conclusions that the law school's use
of racial preferences in the admissions process could be justified as a
narrowly tailored means of serving either a compelling interest in promoting
diversity or providing a remedy for the continuing effects of past discrimina-
tion.3 After a lengthy discussion of Bakke, the Fifth Circuit shocked the
academic community by holding that diversity of the student body was not
a compelling state interest.3 9 It reached this result by concluding that
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, approving of the diversity justification,
had never been a valid precedent because it had not been joined by any
other justice.240 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the diversity
justification had been undermined by subsequent Supreme Court precedent
and was inconsistent with the equal protection principles of treating persons
as individuals rather than as members of racial groups. 24' As such, the
diversity justification stigmatized individuals and perpetuated state approved
race-conscious decisionmaking.242 The court did recognize that universi-
ties could legitimately take account of a variety of factors including, inter
243alia, special talents, alumni connections, and extracurricular activities.
However, the court concluded that the law school could not use race as a
did not object to the separate admit lines since non-minorities who fell below the non-minority
presumptive admit line and the minority presumptive admit line would still receive individualized
consideration along with minorities in the discretionary zone. See id.
232. See id. at 578-79.
233. See id. at 579.
234. See id. at 581.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 581-83.
237. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 939.
238. See id.
239. See id. at 944.
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. See id. at 944-46.
243. See id. at 946.
1998]
TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW
proxy for other characteristics, such as point of view, because this was the
very type of racial stereotype prohibited by equal protection.2" The court
of appeals noted, however, that a correlation between race and other
permissible characteristics, such as financial background, would not violate
equal protection as long as the other characteristics were "not adopted for
the purpose of discriminating on the basis of race. ' 2 45  The Fifth Circuit
also concluded that the use of racial preferences in the admissions process
would undermine equal protection in that it would tend to stigmatize the
recipient as unable to compete.24  Finally, the diversity justification could
lead to a permanent system of state sponsored race consciousness at war
with equal protection's ultimate goal of a colorblind society.
2 47
With respect to the remedial justification, the Fifth Circuit held that the
constraints of strict scrutiny permit the law school to employ racial
preferences only for purposes of providing a remedy for identified present
effects of its own discrimination and not for discrimination by the educa-
tional system as a whole for general societal discrimination.2 48  There was
no dispute that the University of Texas had refused to admit black students
until ordered to do so by the United States Supreme Court in Sweatt v.
Painter49 in 1950.250 The Fifth Circuit concluded, however, that the
school's purported lingering bad reputation in minority communities,
underrepresentation of minorities in the student body, and a perception that
the school's environment was hostile toward minorities did not constitute
such present effects of the law school's past discrimination, especially in
view of the amount of time which had passed since the school was legally
segregated, as well as the affirmative remedial steps subsequently taken by
the school.25'
244. See id. at 946.
245. Id. at 947 n.3 1. This suggests that if a law school decided to rely on these characteristics
because they would result in racial diversity rather than because of their independent validity, it would
be in violation of Hopwood. See id.
246. See id. at 947.
247. See id. at 948 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989)).
248. See id. at 952. The district court had found that it was permissible to consider
discrimination by the Texas higher education system as a whole; however, it also concluded that it would
find sufficient present effects of past discrimination if it focused only on the law school. Hopwood v.
Texas, 861 F. Supp. at 572.
249. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
250. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 953. The district court had set forth the history of racial
discrimination by the University of Texas in some detail. See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. at 553-
57.
251. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 952-55. Because the Court ofAppeals failed to find a compelling
state interest, it did not consider whether the means were narrowly tailored. See id. at 955. The district
court had concluded that the use of race in the admissions process was narrowly tailored to the
compelling interest in providing a remedy for the effects of past discrimination because, without such
preferences, few black or Mexican-American students would be admitted. See Hopwood, 861 F. Supp.
at 573.
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Because the court could not identify a compelling state interest, it
prohibited the law school from relying on race as a factor in the admissions
process. 52 Consequently, it ordered the law school to permit the plaintiffs
to reapply for admission under a process in which race was not taken into
account.2"
Judge Wiener submitted a concurring opinion in which he agreed with
the majority with respect to the remedial justification, but differed as to
diversity.2"4 Judge Wiener argued that, while diversity might well be a
compelling interest, the law school's admissions process was not narrowly
tailored to achieve it.255 He concluded that it was both unnecessary and
inappropriate for the majority to reject the Powell opinion in Bakke since its
validity under existing Supreme Court precedent was very much an open
question.256 Rather, Judge Wiener would invalidate the school's use of
racial preferences on the ground that the racial preferences were not
narrowly tailored to creating diversity in the student body because the
preferences limited their focus to only two racial groups.257 As such, the
process tended to resemble a set-aside for the two preferred groups.25s
The parties did not seek a rehearing en banc, and the Fifth Circuit
declined to grant one on its own motion.2' 9 Judge Politz filed a dissent for
seven judges, arguing that the case should be reheard.26 The dissent
contended that the court reached out in dicta to purportedly overrule the
Powell opinion in Bakke, thus causing significant disruption to settled
academic admissions practices.26' The dissent further argued that Bakke
was a legitimate Supreme Court precedent that had not been overruled by
subsequent decisions. 262 As such, it was beyond the authority of the court
of appeals to reject.263 The United States Supreme Court denied a petition
for certiorari. 2" Justice Ginsberg, joined by Justice Souter, filed a short
opinion stating that granting the petition for certiorari was inappropriate
because the petition challenged only the rationale of that part of the court of
252. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962.
253. See id.
254. See id. (Wiener, J., concurring).
255. See id.
256. See id. at 964. Judge Wiener conceded that Justice Powell was the only justice in Bakke
to discuss diversity and that no other Supreme Court opinion supports the diversity justification. See id.
at 964 n.18. Still, he would leave questions as to the continuing validity of Bakke as a precedent to the
Supreme Court, which in the appropriate case "will have no chance but to go with, over, around, or
through Justice Powell's Bakke opinion." Id.
257. See id. at 965-66.
258. See id. at 966.
259. See Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1996).
260. See id. at 721.
261. See id. at 722.
262. See id. at 722-24.
263. See id.
264. See Texas v. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
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appeals' opinion prohibiting any use of race by the law school in the future
and not the final judgment declaring only the voluntarily discontinued 1992
admissions procedures unconstitutional.265 If a judgment that precludes the
use of race under any circumstances is ever entered, further review of
Hopwood, perhaps even by the Supreme Court, is a possibility.266
IV. BAKKE AS PRECEDENT
A. Was the Powell Opinion in Bakke Ever a Precedent?
Critics of the Hopwood majority have charged that Bakke is clearly
Supreme Court precedent and that consequently Bakke could not be
discarded by a circuit court of appeals. 67  The question of Bakke's
precedential significance has bedeviled commentators ever since the case
was decided.
In Bakke, Justice Powell and the Brennan four clearly concluded that
race could constitutionally be employed as a factor in the admissions pro-
cess. 6 Specifically, the five justices concurred in the following language:
In enjoining petitioner from ever considering the race of any
applicant, however, the courts below failed to recognize that the State has
a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised
admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race and
ethnic origin. For this reason, so much of the California court's judgment
as enjoins petitioner from any consideration of the race of any applicant
must be reversed. 69
Technically, this is the holding of Bakke with respect to the constitutionally
permissible use of race in an admissions process."' On its face, however,
it says very little about when, how, or why race can be employed. The
answers to these questions are essential to understanding what, if anything,
Bakke actually permits. When attempting to derive these answers, it is
necessary to examine the Powell and Brennan opinions carefully in order to
determine whether there is any common ground.
In Marks v. United States, the Supreme Court indicated that "[w]hen
a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720, 722-24 (5th Cir. 1996) (Politz, C.J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 962-63 (5th Cir. 1996) (Wiener, J.,
specially concurring).
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result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be
viewed as the position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds .... ' "2 Marks seems to contem-
plate a situation, as was presented to the Court in that case, in which one
plurality rationale is a lesser included subset of the rationale of another
plurality.272 The Marks approach may not be particularly useful in a case
where the plurality opinions are arguably inconsistent with each other. In
such a case, it may be impossible to conclude in any meaningful respect
which opinion is in fact the "narrowest." Arguably, Bakke is just such a
case.
If Marks simply means that the opinion that affords the most limited
relief on the facts of the case before the Court is the narrowest, and hence
its rationale is controlling, Justice Powell's diversity approach would
presumably be the opinion of the Court in Bakke. This is because Justice
Powell was willing to support a lesser degree of racial preference than
Justice Brennan.273 Institutions that have relied on the Powell approach
since Bakke would argue that this is indeed the proper reading of the case.
However, at a more abstract level, Justice Brennan's approach may be
narrower than Justice Powell's since the former would require the proof of
some type of past discrimination while the latter would not. 74 The Powell
approach would permit an institution seeking to achieve diversity to favor
a racial group that had not been the subject of discrimination within the
United States while the Brennan approach would not. Consequently, the
breadth of a particular holding may depend on the context in which it is
applied.
If Justice Powell never addressed remediation and Justice Brennan
never addressed diversity, an interpreter would be left to struggle with the
difficult, if not meaningless, task of determining which of these two very
different theories is in some sense the narrowest. However, Justice Powell
addressed the remedial justification in some detail, and Justice Brennan
addressed diversity, at least briefly, in a footnote.2
271. 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
272. In Marks, the question was whether Justice Brennan's three judge plurality position in
Memoirs v. Massachuaetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), to the effect that allegedly obscene materials are
sometimes protected by the First Amendment, was the holding of the Court given that Justices Black and
Douglas concurred to make a majority on the ground that obscene material is always protected by the
First Amendment. See Marks, 430 U.S. at 193-94.
273. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 296 n.36.
274. Compare Bakke, 438 U.S. at 296 n.36 (reflecting Justice Powell's conclusion that "race
may be taken into account as a factor in an admissions program") with id. at 326 n.1 (demonstrating
Justice Brennan's view that the use of race was permissible only to correct the effects of past
discrimination).
275. See id. at 326 n.I.
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Justice Powell made it clear that he could not accept a remedial
justification unless it was based on a finding of specific discrimination by
an accountable body.276 Justice Powell's approach is clearly a narrower
approach to remediation than the approach taken by Justice Brennan. With
respect to a remedial justification, it would seem that an institution would
be required to meet the tighter standards of Justice Powell to comply with
Bakke.
Justice Brennan attempted to summarize the agreement on this point by
noting the Bakke opinions meant that:
Government may take race into account when it acts not to demean or
insult any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by
past racial prejudice, at least when appropriate findings have been made
by judicial, legislative, or administrative bodies with competence to act in
this area.277
This statement was a matter of controversy between Justices Powell and
Brennan during the preparation of the Bakke opinions."' Justice Powell
understandably believed the statement did not accurately reflect his
position. 79 Justice Stevens chastised Justice Brennan for attempting to
state the holding of the Court when he did not have the votes to do so.280
Just as Justice Powell indicated that his approach to remediation was
narrower and more demanding than Justice Brennan's, so Justice Brennan
also seemed to indicate that his approach to diversity was narrower and
more demanding than Justice Powell's.2 8 ' Justice Brennan indicated that
he would accept "a plan like the Harvard plan ... at least so long as the
use of race to achieve an integrated student body is necessitated by the
lingering effects of past discrimination." '282 Justice Powell would permit
the use of race as a factor to achieve educational diversity;2"3 however,
Justice Brennan would only allow race to be used to achieve diversity to
cure the effects of past discrimination.8 ' Why, then, is Justice Brennan's
276. See id. at 307.
277. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 325 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
278. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 87-89.
279. See id.; see JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUtON 81-108 (1992) (criticizing
Justice Brennan's attempt to misstate the holding).
280. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408 n.l (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
281. See id. at 326 n.l (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
282. Id. See also Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir.) (quoting this footnote for the
proposition that only Justice Powell accepted diversity as a compelling state interest), cert. denied, 116
S. CL 2581 (1996).
283. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
284. See id. at 326 n.I (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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approach not the narrower and hence controlling approach with respect to
diversity, as Justice Powell's opinion is with respect to remediation?
Justice Brennan's footnote may require an institution that uses race in
achieving diversity only to explain that it was necessary to do so because of
the continuing effects of past "societal" discrimination. This would impose
an additional burden on the institution; however, this burden might be easy
enough to satisfy, at least to the extent that the institution was using race to
favor blacks and perhaps Latinos. If Justice Brennan's rationale simply
narrows Justice Powell's approach, then pursuant to Marks, it presumably
controls.2' 5 However, it certainly may be argued that Justice Brennan's
emphasis on remediation undermines and contradicts, rather than narrows
the Powell approach.
For Justice Powell, a remedial approach could be employed only
pursuant to specific findings of past discrimination by a competent and
accountable body.2" 6 It would be peculiar, to say the least, if Justice
Brennan could, through a casual footnote, impose the type of loose remedial
approach that Justice Powell adamantly rejected in the text of his opinion.
Moreover, it would appear that remediation is not simply a subset of
diversity but an entirely different and arguably inconsistent theory.287 For
Justice Powell, diversity had nothing to do with the remediation of past
discrimination.288 For Justice Brennan, diversity is only permissible as an
aspect of such remediation." 9 Justice Powell's approach looks to the
future while Justice Brennan's approach focuses on the past.2 90 Viewing
diversity as one method of rectifying past societal discrimination does not
simply add one more element to the equation. It changes the focus of the
diversity approach entirely from enhancement of the educational process to
compensation for prior wrongs. Under this rationale, the focus in the
admissions process shifts from the positive contribution that an applicant can
285. See Marks, 430 U.S. at 194-95.
286. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
287. See Chen, supra note 84, at 1863-67 (arguing that diversity and remediation are mutually
exclusive theories). See also Chin, supra note 20, at 898, 908; Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race as
Proxy, and Religion as Proxy, 43 UCLA L. REv. 2059, 2059 (1996) ("Diversity is appealing for what
it is not .... It is not based on controversial views of compensation for past discrimination."). See also
Davis v. Halpem, 768 F. Supp. 968, 981-82 (1991) (noting that the school seemed to confuse diversity
with a remedial approach).
288. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
289. See id. at 326 n.I (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
290. Justice Stevens has frequently argued that the Court should favor forward-looking over
backward-looking approaches in this area to avoid the focus on blameworthiness and hence the inherent
divisiveness of the remedial approach. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 601 (1990)
(Stevens, J., concurring); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See
also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Comment: Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases,
100 HARV. L. REv. 78, 91-97 (1986) (favoring "forward-looking" over "backward-looking"
justifications of racial preferences).
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make to the student body to the degree to which the applicant's racial group
has been mistreated in the past. This approach would limit educational
diversity to those racial groups who could show that they were victims of
past discrimination. This is quite inconsistent with the type of broadbased
diversity favored by Justice Powell and reflected in the Harvard plan.29'
Arguably, the Brennan and Powell opinions might be reconciled by
construing the holding to mean that a diversity approach may be utilized
only if the institution satisfies Justice Brennan's rationale by finding
lingering effects of past discrimination and Justice Powell's by making
specific fact findings. Such a solution destroys the utility of the diversity
justification by requiring a predicate finding of past discrimination that most
universities could not possibly satisfy. This would be a classic case of
saving the village by destroying it.
Another reading might proclaim that the holding is wholly contained
within the two sentences of section V-C of the Powell opinion. An
institution is free to ignore everything else in the Powell and Brennan
opinions since the rest of these opinions did not attract a majority of the
Court. To comply with Bakke, section V-C says that an institution needs to
ensure that it has constructed "a properly devised admissions program
involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin."292
How is the institution to know whether the process is "properly devised"
or whether it is "competitive" unless it consults the Powell opinion with its
references to the Harvard plan? If the Powell opinion, representing only one
vote, is binding with respect to these considerations, why then is the
Brennan opinion, representing four votes, not equally binding with respect
to the need of tying diversity to remediation of past discrimination?
Perhaps the Powell opinion provides useful guidance with respect to
what might be constitutionally acceptable, but it does not have the force of
law as such. The difficulty with this concession is that it leaves educational
institutions more exposed than they would prefer. Since section V-C says
nothing about "diversity," "pluses in the file," or "the Harvard plan," 293
an institution could not be certain that its admission process was constitu-
tionally valid simply because it was modelled on the guidelines in Justice
Powell's opinion. The legality of the admissions process would depend on
whether a reviewing court concluded that the plan was properly devised and
competitive. Presumably, such a court would rely on the Powell opinion in
Bakke, but it would not be required to do so if the Powell opinion's
discussion of diversity did not constitute part of the holding.
291. See supra note 268-70 and accompanying text.
292. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
293. See id.
[Vol. 29:1
THE FUTURE OF DIVERSITY JUSTIFICATION
A university that placed its reliance on nothing more than section V-C
would face another significant difficulty. As the law has developed through
Croson and Adarand, it is clear that the Supreme Court will not sustain a
racial classification absent a compelling state interest; yet, there is no
recognition of compelling state interests in section V-C. 94  Instead,
section V-C states that an institution has "a substantial state interest" in the
competitive use of race in the admissions process.295 However, it is well
established today that institutions desiring to employ race in the admissions
process, such as the University of Texas in Hopwood, need to establish that
diversity is a compelling state interest in order to survive strict scrutiny. In
order to do so, institutions must move beyond section V-C and rely on the
remainder of the Powell opinion. Also, because Justice Powell constituted
only one vote, an institution would need to look beyond section V-C and
beyond Justice Powell's opinion to Justice Brennan's. An institution would
be unable to find adequate support in the Brennan opinion for the proposi-
tion that diversity is a compelling state interest. Therefore, an institution
that chose to rely on section V-C as justification for a diversity-based racial
preference program must recognize that, at most, it has received an
ambiguous and arguably useless blessing from the Supreme Court.
In a recent article, Professor Amar and Mr. Katyal have argued that
perhaps Justice Brennan's footnote, qualifying the Powell diversity
approach, may have stemmed from a concern that diversity might be
misused.296 Thus, it would be a misuse of diversity to exclude presently
overrepresented minorities who have been the subject of past discrimination,
like Jews and Asians.297 Perhaps Justice Brennan was concerned about the
continued use of diversity after disparities based on societal discrimination
had been ameliorated.298 Presumably, Justice Brennan would be prepared
to accept the Powell diversity approach as long as neither of these problems
existed. The most obvious difficulty with this reading is that there is no
evidence whatsoever to suggest that this is what Justice Brennan had in
mind. Further, there is no reason to believe that Justice Powell would have
accepted either of these qualifications. The employment of a diversity-based
admissions process by an institution that attracts a disproportionate
percentage of Jewish or Asian applicants would almost inevitably result in
the exclusion of some students from these groups who would otherwise be
admitted. As long as the decisions are made on a competitive basis, this
result would not trouble either Justice Powell or Justice Brennan. If Justice
Brennan was suggesting that diversity is only appropriate as long as it can
294. See id.
295. See id.
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be viewed as necessitated by the lingering effects of past discrimination, one
must return to the question of whether this emphasis on diversity as a
remedy is at all consistent with the concept of educational diversity as
articulated by Justice Powell. If diversity is about educational enhancement
through exposure to different perspectives, racially grounded cultural
differences could contribute to diversity quite apart from the legacy of
discrimination. If so, there is no reason why its justification should vanish
simply because the effects of discrimination have been ameliorated.
The holding of Bakke is a hard nut to crack. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to explain when, how, and why an institution may utilize race
in its admissions process in a manner that is consistent with the opinions of
Justices Powell and Brennan and does not render the actual holding in
section V-C virtually an empty vessel. As Professor Sunstein recently
stated, the rule of Bakke that a state university may use race as a factor, but
not a quota, "represented the view of Justice Powell alone. ' 299  He
pointed out that "the other eight participating Justices explicitly rejected that
rule.'
3 °°
Ultimately, Bakke may hold slightly more than the Fifth Circuit
assumed in Hopwood, but significantly less than its advocates contend.
Bakke does hold that race can be used as a competitive factor in an
admissions process, but it does not hold that diversity is a compelling state
interest or that there is any other compelling state interest that would justify
a competitive use of race. The Fifth Circuit in Hopwood was quite arguably
correct in concluding that Bakke provides little useful precedential support
for a race-conscious diversity-based admissions program.
B. Has Subsequent Supreme Court Precedent Undermined Justice
Powell's Diversity Justification?
In addition to concluding that the Powell opinion, legitimizing some
use of race in the admissions process, never received the support of a
majority of the Justices, the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood also concluded that
in any event, it had been undermined by subsequent Supreme Court
precedent. This controversial conclusion provoked disagreement from both
Judge Wiener3' and Chief Judge Politz.
30 2
299. See Cass A. Sunstein, Public Deliberation, Affirmative Action, and the Supreme Court, 84
CALIF. L. REv. 1179, 1185 (1996).
300. See id.
301. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 962 (5th Cir.) (Wiener, J., concurring), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996); supra notes 254-58 and accompanying text.
302. See Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720, 721 (5th Cir. 1996) (Politz, CI., dissenting); supra
notes 259-63 and accompanying text.
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The Hopwood majority quoted Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in
Croson where she stated that " '[u]nless [racial classifications] are strictly
reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial
inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.' "303 Justice O'Connor
had made this statement to explain that the Court needed to apply the strict
standard of review to all racial classifications.3  As a basis for this
principle, Justice O'Connor cited Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke.3"5
However, because the Powell opinion in Bakke was the genesis of the notion
that diversity could be a compelling state interest, it would be strange
authority to cite for the principle that diversity could not be a compelling
interest. Justice O'Connor's statement did not address the question of
whether anything, other than remediation, could be a compelling state
interest, a question that was not before the Court in Croson.3° Therefore,
Justice O'Connor's statement would appear to be casual dicta taken quite
out of context by the Hopwood majority. If Bakke was precedent, this
quotation provides no basis for suggesting that Bakke has been undermined.
If anything, Justice O'Connor's opinion in Croson strengthens the
legitimacy of the Powell opinion in Bakke. In Croson, a majority of the
Court, for the first time, agreed with Justice Powell's important conclusion
that strict scrutiny should apply to benign racial classifications.3"" In
reaching this conclusion, Justice O'Connor cited to and quoted from Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke. 8 With respect to the criteria for evaluating
remedial programs, Justice O'Connor built upon the principles that Justice
Powell had begun to set forth in Bakke and continued to explain in his
concurrence in Wygant. °9 Since Croson involved neither an educational
context nor a diversity justification, the Court had no reason to address the
validity of the Powell approach in Bakke and did not do so.3"' Judge
Wiener called attention to these distinctions in his Hopwood concur-
rence.31
The Hopwood majority then turned to Justice O'Connor's dissent in
Metro Broadcasting, where she was joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia,
and Kennedy in observing that:
303. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944-45 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
493 (1989)).
304. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
305. See id. at 493-94 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978)).
306. See id. at 486.
307. See id. at 493-94. Although Justice O'Connor wrote only for a plurality at this point in her
opinion, Justice Scalia, who concurred in the judgment, clearly agreed that at least the strict standard of
review should apply. See supra notes 153-54 accompanying text.
308. See id. at 493-98. Justice O'Connor quoted from Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke six
times in the standard of review section of her opinion alone. See id.
309. See id. at 498-506 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986)).
310. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 965 n.21 (Wiener, J., concurring).
311. See id. at 964-65 & nn.18-19 & 21.
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Modem equal protection doctrine has recognized only one ... [compel-
ling state] interest: remedying the effects of racial discrimination. The
interest in increasing the diversity of broadcast viewpoints is clearly not
a compelling interest. It is simply too amorphous, too insubstantial, and
too unrelated to any legitimate basis for employing racial classifica-
tions.31
2
The Hopwood majority noted that Justice Thomas expressed agreement
with this general view in his Adarand concurrence,1 3 thereby indicating
that there is now a majority of the Court that has cast doubt on diversity as
a compelling state interest.31 4
This point must be taken quite seriously. The majority in Metro
Broadcasting, using the intermediate standard of review, sustained the
congressionally approved use of racial preferences in the award and transfer
of broadcast licenses on the ground that promoting diversity of viewpoints
over the public airwaves is a substantial state interest .3  This would
appear to be quite similar to the interest in promoting diversity of discussion
in the classroom identified as compelling by Justice Powell in Bakke.3" 6
For example, both interests can be supported by First Amendment argu-
ments.3 7
After quoting her Croson opinion, which the Fifth Circuit relied on in
Hopwood, Justice O'Connor explained in her Metro Broadcasting dissent
that an interest capable of supporting the use of racial preferences must be
"sufficiently specific and verifiable, such that it supports only limited and
carefully defined uses of racial classifications. ' 318 Justice O'Connor cited
the remediation of societal discrimination in Croson and the role model
theory in Wygant as two interests that had previously failed to meet these
criteria.3" 9 She then stated that the interest in increasing diverse viewpoints
in broadcasting suffered from the same problems.32 ° As with societal
discrimination, there was nothing short of racial proportionality to limit the
scope of either the preferences or their duration. 2' Nor was there a
principled means of determining which viewpoints were underrepresented
and hence which groups were entitled to preferences absent a remedial
312. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612 (1990).
313. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945.
314. See id.
315. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 567-68 (1990); supra notes 158-64 and
accompanying text.
316. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12 (1978).
317. See id. at 312.
318. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 613 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
319. See id. at 613-14.
320. See id. at 614.
321. See id.
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justification. 22 She noted that such an approach "impermissibly equat[es]
race with thoughts and behavior" and would make it impossible to
determine whether the decision maker was truly attempting to encourage
particular viewpoints or merely creating naked racial preferences."'
Justice O'Connor noted that such an interest could be utilized readily as a
cover to achieve racial proportionality into the indefinite future. 24
In rejecting a policy based on a presumption that race dictates behavior,
Justice O'Connor noted that Justice Powell had similarly rejected the state's
argument in Bakke that racial preferences would serve a compelling state
interest by increasing the number of minority physicians who would return
to serve minority communities.325 Justice O'Connor further commented
that a stereotype equating race with behavior is necessarily both overinclu-
sive and underinclusive and, as such, cannot meet the narrow tailoring
requirements of strict scrutiny. 26 Moreover, such a stereotype would be
inconsistent with the individualistic premises of equal protection even if
empirically supported.327
Justice O'Connor did not discuss Justice Powell's diversity justification
in her Metro Broadcasting dissent, despite the fact that the majority relied
on it in upholding the programs. 2 However, the parallels between the
two cases are inescapable. Both the University of California at Davis and
the FCC relied on racial preferences based on the assumption that people of
different races would hold and express different viewpoints and perspectives
based on racially diverse experiences and that the promotion of such
diversity was quite valuable.329 If designing a policy based on these
conclusions is impermissible racial stereotyping in the broadcast context, it
is not obvious why it would be any different in the education context. In
each instance, the assumptions on which such policies are based would seem
to be basically the same and thus, subject to the same criticisms. Each can
claim support from the First Amendment, and each can claim to be of some
social significance.33° However, because the government has traditionally
been permitted a larger regulatory role in the broadcast context due to
spectrum scarcity,331 this might suggest that there could be more leeway
for racial preferences in broadcasting than in education.
322. See id.
323. Id. at 615.
324. See id. at 614.
325. See id. at 619.
326. See id. at 621-22.
327. See id. at 620.
328. See id. at 579-80.
329. See id. at 569-71.
330. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
331. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396-400 (1969).
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Metro Broadcasting might be distinguished from Bakke on the ground
that there is an extra step in the FCC policy in Metro Broadcasting that was
not present in Bakke. In Bakke, the state argued, and Justice Powell seemed
to assume, that racially and otherwise diverse students "may bring to a
professional school of medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich
the training of its student body and better equip its graduates to render with
understanding their vital service to humanity." '332 In Metro Broadcasting,
the government argued that minority owners would exercise their authority
to ensure that station management would broadcast programming which
would increase diversity of viewpoints over the airwaves.333 Justice
O'Connor challenged this latter assumption on the ground that station
owners may have limited ability to control programming.334 Moreover,
she challenged the assumption that persons of a particular race will generally
express a particular point of view with even more vigor." In contrast,
Justice Powell's diversity approach could be read as resting on this
assumption.336 The Hopwood majority thought so."'
Bakke could also be distinguished from Metro Broadcasting by the way
the racial preferences operated. As noted above, Metro Broadcasting
involved two different racial preference programs.338 One, the distress
sale policy, provided a preference only for members of specified racial
groups." 9 This was the type of flat set-aside that was clearly inconsistent
with the Powell opinion in Bakke.3 40 The other racial preference provided
a plus-in-the-file for minority ownership, which was to be considered along
with several other specified factors.34' This program was more like the
Harvard plan but there appear to be some relevant differences. Under the
Harvard plan, the characteristics of all applicants are assessed and compared
to determine whether they will add to the diversity of the student body.342
In Metro Broadcasting, however, although racial diversity of ownership was
being balanced against other factors, it was not compared with other
potentially diversifying characteristics.343 Thus, it would seem that the
FCC was concerned with a narrower diversity than Justice Powell found
332. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
333. See Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 569-71.
334. See id. at 627 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
335. See id.
336. See infra notes 370-79 and accompanying text.
337. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945-46 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581
(1996).
338. See Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 552.
339. See id.
340. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299.
341. See Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 552.
342. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-18, 321-24.
343. See Metro Broad, 497 U.S. at 566-68.
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appropriate in Bakke." On the other hand, it did not appear that any of
this mattered to Justice O'Connor. Her primary. complaint was not with the
operation of the Specific preferences, but rather with the underlying
assumption that race correlates with behavior, viewpoint, or perspective."
Although Justice O'Connor did not challenge the Bakke diversity
justification in her Metro Broadcasting dissent, and even relied on other
aspects of the Powell opinion, the Fifth Circuit was certainly correct in
recognizing that the primary thrust of her dissent inevitably struck at the
very heart of that opinion.""' When Metro Broadcasting was decided, the
O'Connor opinion did not undermine Bakke since it was after all, a
dissent.347 However, when Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion for the
Court in Adarand Constructors v. Pena overruling Metro Broadcasting, the
tables had turned.34 Certainly the Court did not need to adopt Justice
O'Connor's Metro Broadcasting critique of diversity in broadcasting to
overrule the case.349 It was more than sufficient that the Metro Broadcast-
ing majority applied an intermediate standard of review because the Court
had now agreed that even Congress must justify racial preferences pursuant
to strict scrutiny.
350
Still, Metro Broadcasting was overruled by Justice O'Connor,'M the
three Justices who joined in her Metro Broadcasting dissent,M  and Justice
Thomas, who submitted a concurring opinion in Adarand essentially
agreeing with Justice O'Connor's basic critique of the non-remedial use of
racial preferences.35 3 Thus, although Adarand does not outlaw FCC use
of racial preferences to achieve diversity, much less educational use, the
decision in Adarand would seem to indicate that a majority of the Court
may presently be inclined to disfavor a justification which presumes that
race produces divergent viewpoints, perspectives, or behavior.
The Hopwood majority rejected the law school's argument that Justice
O'Connor's attempt to distinguish Justice Powell's diversity approach in
Bakke from the role-model justification before the Court in Wygant indicated
344. See Amar & Katyal, supra note 15, at 1762-65 (arguing that Justice O'Connor was
especially concerned with the degree to which the FCC programs in Metro Broadcasting categorically
equated race with viewpoint); CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE 137 (1996).
345. See Amar & Katyal, supra note 15, at 1762-65.
346. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945.
347. See Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 602-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
348. 515 U.S. 200, 225-27 (1995).
349. See generally Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 602-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that the
use of racial classifications in FCC broadcasting policies was not permissible under standards established
by previous opinions of the Court).
350. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
351. See id.
352. See Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 602.
353. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240-41 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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that Bakke retained precedential value.354  The Fifth Circuit noted that
Justice O'Connor was merely being descriptive in noting that Bakke was
different and was not indicating her approval." 5  Moreover, the Court
found that her subsequent opinions in Croson and Metro Broadcasting
undermined her statement in Wygant.35 This seems fairly convincing.
Justice O'Connor addressed the issue of racial preferences in far greater
depth in Metro Broadcasting, Croson, and Adarand, than in Wygant. To the
extent of any inconsistency, presumably her later opinions should be given
greater weight.
If the Powell opinion in Bakke constituted a valid precedent for the
propositions that diversity in the admissions process is a compelling state
interest and that race may be used as one of many factors to obtain a diverse
student body, it cannot be concluded that the Court has overruled such a
holding.357 Since Bakke, the Court has not decided another educational
admissions case nor has it purported to confront the Powell opinion directly.
Therefore, from a technical standpoint, Bakke is still good law, if it ever
was. Nevertheless, in recent cases that are related but not directly on point,
five members of the Court appear to have indicated that they disagree with
the underlying assumption of the Powell diversity rationale-that race may
be used as a proxy for viewpoint, perspective, or behavior.35 Unless one
or more of these five Justices should change their mind, there is reason to
believe that the present Court would reject diversity as a compelling state
interest. 5 9 This is not to say, however, that the Court might not cling to
Bakke as a matter of stare decisis or distinguish the educational context from
employment, contracting, voting, or broadcasting. However, the momentum
of the Court would appear to run to the contrary." Consequently,
Hopwood was certainly correct in suggesting that recent Supreme Court
354. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945 n.27.
355. See id.
356. See id.
357. But see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Reverse Discrimination and Law School Faculty Hiring:
The Undiscovered Opinion, 71 TEx. L. REv. 993, 999 (1991). Professor Paulsen observes that:
[l]t is not at all clear what it means to "overrule" a case like Bakke, as there was no majority
opinion and the opinion usually thought to represent the holding of the case-Justice Powell's
half-and-half concurrence--announced a rationale rejected by eight Justices in the Bakke case
itself. It is not clear that Justice Powell's opinion was, in any meaningful sense of the term,
"the law"- even at the time Bakke was decided. It scarcely seems necessary for the Court
to formally overrule single-member concurrences by since-retired Justices in order for current
precedents to be given their full logical weight.
Id.
358. See, e.g., Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1037,
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precedent calls the Powell opinion into serious question. 36 ' However, the
decision was incorrect to the extent that it suggested that Bakke has been
effectively overruled.362
C. Is Justice Powell's Diversity Justification in Bakke Inconsistent with
Equal Protection Principles as Expounded by the Supreme Court?
1. Hopwood and Equal Protection Principles
Finally, the Hopwood majority argued that Justice Powell's approach
in Bakke was inconsistent with well developed principles of equal protec-
tion.363 Essentially, the Court contended that the use of race as a factor in
an admissions process was inconsistent with equal protection principles
because it treated persons as members of groups rather than as individuals,
stereotyped and stigmatized the individuals whom the process was
supposedly designed to benefit, and created a system under which the use
of race could extend indefinitely into the future.'" There is no question
that these three themes resonate through the Supreme Court's opinions. The
emphasis on the individualistic nature of equal protection would seem to be
the major premise of all of the Court's recent affirmative action decisions,
including Wygant, Croson,Adarand, and the voting rights cases. The Court
has clearly cast its lot with the individualistic oriented anti-discrimination
principle and rejected the academically popular anti-subordination princi-
ple.36 Likewise, the Court has consistently expressed concern about the
potentially stigmatizing effect of benign racial classifications, as well as their
potentially indefinite duration.366
2. Justice Powell in Bakke and Equal Protection Principles
The Fifth Circuit's use of these principles to reject diversity as a
compelling state interest is somewhat puzzling given that Justice Powell
essentially shared at least two, if not all three, of these very same principles
in his Bakke opinion. 67 He wrote that "it is the individual who is entitled
to judicial protection against classifications based upon his racial or ethnic
background because such distinctions impinge upon personal rights, rather
361. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
362. See id. at 944-46.
363. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
364. See id. at 945-48.
365. See Fried, supra note 34, at 107-09. It is often pointed out, however, that consideration of
individuals under equal protection analysis must still make reference to characteristics possessed by
members of a group, be it race, expertise or intelligence. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 299, at 1188.
366. See supra notes 29-34.
367. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978).
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than the individual only because of his membership in a particular
group."368  Indeed, it would not be inaccurate to say that the Powell
opinion in Bakke is one of the cornerstones of the Court's individualistic
approach to equal protection and race. 69 Although Justice Powell debated
with Justice Brennan about the significance of stigma in the analysis, he did
note that "preferential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes
holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special
protection based on a factor having no relationship to individual
worth."3 ' Thus, Justice Powell was also concerned with the stigmatizing
effect of purportedly benign racial classifications."' Although Justice
Powell did not express concern about the indefinite reach of racial
preferences in Bakke, it was a concern that he took seriously in his opinions
in Fullilove372 and Wygant.
373
Justice Powell's emphasis on the individualistic character of equal
protection, as well as the potentially stigmatizing effects of racial preferences,
led him to conclude that strict scrutiny must apply to the benign use of
racial preferences.3 4  This of course is a principle that the present Court
endorses.37' Likewise, Justice Powell concluded that a set-aside was not
narrowly tailored to the achievement of a diverse student body because it
would fail to treat applicants as individuals with respect to race and would
not achieve broad based diversity in any event.376 Justice Powell certainly
did not believe that the individualistic nature of equal protection or the
potentially stigmatizing effect of racial preferences precluded diversity from
being a compelling state interest.377 Rather, he found the interest in
diversity compelling because the state was able to convince him that
diversity was quite important to its educational mission and that it was
supported, at least tangentially, by First Amendment considerations.378
However, if a diversity program uses race as a factor it must withstand
the rigors of strict scrutiny.379  This was Justice Powell's method, and
indeed the Court's normal method, of attempting to reconcile highly
368. Id.
369. See Kent Greenawalt, The Unresolved Problems of Reverse Discrimination, 67 CAL. L. REV.
87, 110 (1979) (commenting on Justice Powell's decisive rejection of the "notion that the equal
protection clause is exclusively, or even mainly, a protection of special groups").
370. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298.
371. See id.
372. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 513 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
373. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275 (1986).
374. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290.
375. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
376. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-19.
377. See id. at 314.
378. See id. at 316.
379. See id. at 290-91.
[Vol. 29:1
THE FUTURE OF DIVERSITY JUSTIFICATION
important state interests with fundamental constitutional rights.38° The
Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, seemed to have concluded that the very
factors which give rise to strict scrutiny also preclude the state's interest in
diversity from qualifying as compelling.38" ' This would seem to prevent
any meaningful balancing of interests. This is essentially the hard line
colorblind approach taken by Justice Scalia382 and Justice Thomas." 3
It is far from obvious, however, that a majority of the Supreme Court
believes that general equal protection principles dictate such a result.
38 4
3. The Risks to Equal Protection Principles Posed by Racial Preferences
a. Individuality and the Risk of Stereotyping
The Hopwood majority argued that diversity was inconsistent with
equal protection principles because "[i]t treats minorities as a group, rather
than as individuals. It may further remedial purposes but, just as likely,
may promote improper racial stereotypes, thus fueling racial hostility."38
The Fifth Circuit continued by noting that "[t]o believe that a person's
race controls his point of view is to stereotype him." 386 It acknowledged
that Justice Powell in Bakke apparently believed race could serve as a proxy
for viewpoint, but then the court quoted from law review articles critical of
Justice Powell's position."' The Fifth Circuit then quoted Justice O'Con-
nor's dissent in Metro Broadcasting: "Social scientists may debate how
peoples' thoughts and behavior reflect their background, but the Constitution
provides that the government may not allocate benefits or burdens among
individuals based on the assumption that race or ethnicity determines how
they act or think."3 8
The Fifth Circuit did not cite a majority opinion of the Supreme Court
for the proposition that any use of race as a proxy for viewpoint or perspec-
tive automatically violates an equal protection principle prohibiting racial
stereotyping.
380. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
381. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. CL 2581 (1996).
382. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
383. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239, 240-41 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
384. See e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
385. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. CL 2581 (1996).
386. Id. at 946.
387. See id. (citing Richard A. Posner, The Defunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential
Treatment of Minorities, 1974 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 2 (1976); Michael S. Paulsen, Reverse Discrimination
and Law School Faculty Hiring: The Undiscovered Opinion, 71 TEx. L. REv. 993, 1000 (1993)).
388. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 946 (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
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To suggest that the diversity justification is based on the assumption
that a person's race controls point of view is an overstatement.3' 9 As
Professor Paul Brest and Miranda Oshige noted in a recent article, such an
assumption is basically a straw man.3 Advocates of diversity need not
and should not assert that there is a black point of view or even several
black points of view.39 ' This is probably not the case, and it hardly
matters. The fact that a person's race, like economic, geographic, or
employment background, will lead to experiences that will occasionally
provide a different perspective on the discussion of issues is enough.392
A person who has been raised in a home receiving welfare may bring a
different perspective to a discussion of welfare reform than someone from
a wealthy suburban environment. A person who has lived in a totalitarian
country may bring a different perspective to freedom of press issues than a
typical American student. A person with combat experience might bring a
different perspective to a discussion of women in the military than a life-
long civilian. So it is with race. A black person may offer a distinct
perspective on the treatment of blacks by the police or the adequacy of city
services provided to the black community, based not on a stereotypical black
point of view, but rather on personal experience.393 Then again, he may
not.
The fact that black persons may offer distinct perspectives based on
unique experiences is all that diversity need claim, and this appears to be a
rather modest claim. Moreover, a person's perspective is based, not on
some overreaching stereotype, but rather on the individual's unique life
389. See Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47' STAN. L. REV. 855,
862 (1995). See also Blasi, supra note 56, at 44 (discussing the use of race as a proxy for other
characteristics important in education).
390. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 389, at 862.
391. See id.
392. See id.; Amar & Katyal, supra note 15, at 1776. in Metro Broadcasting, Justice Brennan
attempted to draw this distinction, at least to some extent. See Metro Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. 547, 579-83
(1990). However, Justice O'Connor suggested it was an irrelevant distinction. See id. at 616, 620
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan wrote:
The predictive judgment about the overall result of minority entry into broadcasting is not a
rigid assumption about how minority owners will behave in every case but rather is akin to
Justice Powell's conclusion in Bakke that greater admission of minorities would contribute, on
the average, "to the robust exchange of ideas." To be sure, there is no ironclad guarantee that
each minority owner will contribute to diversity.
Id. at 579 (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor replied:
The racial generalization inevitably does not apply to certain individuals, and those persons
may legitimately claim that they have been judged according to their race rather than upon a
relevant criterion.... This reliance on the "aggregate" and on probabilities confirms that the
Court has abandoned heightened scrutiny, which requires a direct rather than approximate fit
of means to ends.
Id. at 620 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
393. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 389, at 862.
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experiences.394 As such, focusing on the distinct perspectives a black person
may offer would be more consistent with the individualistic approach to
equal protection the Court favors, as opposed to an approach that would
disregard a significant personal characteristic of the individual such as
race.
395
As Professor Sandalow put it some time ago, "race and ethnicity are
socially significant characteristics." 396  There will be occasions when a
person's experiences will be affected by race. 9 Critical race scholars
have documented a wide range of instances, often through narrative method,
in which race has apparently influenced the way an individual has been
treated, either by government officials, or by members of the dominant
culture.398 A commonly cited example is the case of a black student or
professor stopped and questioned by the police in a middle-class, white,
suburban neighborhood near a university campus for no apparent reason
other than race.399 There will generally be no adequate race-neutral proxy
capable of illuminating similar instances of racially influenced treatment or
experience.4  If an individual is treated differently specifically because
of race, that experience would not necessarily be shared by someone who
is poor, or someone who grew up in an urban environment, or someone who
attended public schools. If institutions are allowed to pursue students who
add to diversity based on any relevant characteristic except race, true
diversity will be undermined almost as much as if institutions pursued only
that diversity which is attributable to racial difference.
Intuitively, it seems obvious that persons of different races may have
experienced racially-based differential treatment, which in turn can
contribute to the overall diversity of perspective and, hence, understanding.
Presumably, the Hopwood majority, and to some extent Justice O'Connor
in Metro Broadcasting, contend that racially based diversity is inconsistent
with constitutional principle, even if there is a relationship between race and
394. See id.
395. See Aleinikoff, supra note 36, at 1094; see Gotanda, supra note 17, at 1140.
396. Sandalow, supra note 82, at 683. See also Aleinikoff, supra note 36, at 1062 (explaining
that society is not colorblind because race is socially significant to disadvantaged minorities); Sheila
Foster, Difference and Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of "Diversity, " 1993 Wis. L.
REv. 105, 140 ("Race is a proxy for experiencing life in the United States differently.").
397. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 389, at 862.
398. See DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY (1994); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Taunya Lovell Banks, Two Life Stories: Reflections of One
Black Woman Law Professor, reprinted in Critical Race Theory 329 (1996); Richard Delgado & David
Yun, The Neoconservative Case Against Hate Speech Regulation - Lively, D 'Souza, Gates, Carter and
the Toughlove Crowd, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1807, 1813 (1994); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property,
106 HARV. L. REv. 1709 (1993).
399. This happened to a black professor at the school where I teach within the past few years.
See Paul Butler, Walking While Black, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 10, 1997, at 23 (recounting a similar
incident).
400. See Blasi, supra note 56, at 44.
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experience.4" To a significant degree, this contention would seem to be
based on a fear that such a reliance on race would risk engaging in the very
type of racial stereotyping that the Fourteenth Amendment is intended to
eradicate.4"" The Hopwood majority makes this point with the following
quotation from Judge Posner: " 'The use of a racial characteristic to
establish a presumption that the individual also possesses other, and socially
relevant, characteristics, exemplifies, encourages, and legitimizes the mode
of thought and behavior that underlies most prejudice and bigotry in modem
America.' ,403
To put it differently, the Hopwood majority is pointing out that,
because of our nation's history of discrimination, and the history and
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, race is constitutionally different
from virtually all other personal characteristics.4 " The risk of abuse,
especially through stereotyping, is of a qualitatively different order.4"'
Racial stereotypes have been used as instruments of discrimination in the
United States to an extent that no other characteristic has been. This is
scarcely controversial.
Due to this history and the continued risk of abuse, the Supreme Court
has insisted on employing strict scrutiny whenever the state relies on race,
even for purportedly benign purposes. 4's As noted above, this was the
approach of Justice Powell in Bakke,4 " as well as a majority of the
Supreme Court in Croson408 and Adarand.4 9  Thus, a state institution
could explicitly favor applicants who contributed to diversity based on
geography, age, educational background, employment experience, or special
skills and talents with virtually no prospect of meaningful judicial over-
sight.410 If, however, the institution chooses to diversify based on race,
it must satisfy the most demanding judicial standard.41'
The Hopwood majority and, in a noneducational context, the O'Connor
dissent in Metro Broadcasting, go farther, contending that, when strict
scrutiny is applied, the interest in racial diversity cannot qualify as an
401. See Volokh, supra note 287, at 2059-62.
402. See id.; Fried, supra note 34, at 123; Paulsen, supra note 387, at 1000-01; Chen, supra note
84, at 1892; Charles W. Collier, The New Logic of Affirmative Action, 45 DuKE L. J. 559, 572-73
(1995).
403. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 946 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996)
(quoting Richard A Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of
Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 12 (1974)).
404. See id. at 939-40.
405. See id.
406. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287-91 (1978).
407. See supra Part 11I.A.
408. See supra Part 111.B.3.
409. See supra Part 111.B.5.
410. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 946.
411. See id. at 951-52.
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interest compelling enough to survive, presumably in part because of the
risk of abuse through stereotyping. 1 2 Asserting that diversity cannot be
a compelling state interest might be an appropriate response if race is being
used as a broad-based proxy for viewpoint or behavior."1 3 This was
arguably the case in Metro Broadcasting, where Congress and the FCC
concluded that minority broadcast owners would likely provide program-
ming of interest to minority listeners.4 The Hopwood rationale might
also follow if an institution employed racial preferences on the theory that
students of different races would bring racially distinctive voices or
viewpoints to the campus. The courts might appropriately reject this interest
as an improper and overly broad stereotype. This should not necessarily be
the case, however, if in a competitive process an institution honestly uses
race as simply one of many characteristics which may be indicative of the
unique personal experiences of the individual applicant."' This is consis-
tent with the Powell approach in Bakke, as well as the individualistic
approach to equal protection that is rightly skeptical of racial stereotyp-
ing.'
16
The difference between racially distinct viewpoints and racially
influenced experiences may seem slim, but it is basically the difference
between treating a person as a member of a group and treating a person as
an individual. This difference should also be the difference between
violating equal protection and complying with it. By examining an
institution's explanation of why it pursues racial diversity, as well as the
weight it accords to race compared to other potentially diversifying factors,
a court should be able to evaluate whether the institution is either employing
race as a stereotype for viewpoint or behavior or evaluating the applicant's
race as one of many personal characteristics which may have contributed to
the individual's life experiences. If it appears that an institution accords an
applicant's race overriding significance in the admissions process, it should
be apparent to a reviewing court that the institution is not making a good
faith attempt to comply with Justice Powell's diversity justification.4"7 As
such, it would not satisfy strict scrutiny.4 8 In addition, as will be devel-
oped later, requiring institutions that desire to utilize race as a diversifying
factor to make their admissions procedures and their gross admissions
statistics publicly available could also provide a significant check against
412. See id. at 946-48; Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602-05 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
413. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 389, at 862.
414. See Amar and Katyal, supra note 15, at 1761.
415. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315-19 (1978).
416. See supra Part IV.A.
417. See Amar & Katyal, supra note 15, at 1777.
418. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20.
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abuse through stereotyping and stops short of rejecting diversity as a
compelling state interest.419
b. The Risk of Stigma
The majority in Hopwood also contended that the diversity rationale
was inconsistent with equal protection principles because it inevitably
stigmatized its "beneficiaries" as less qualified.42 This is a common
criticism of any strictly non-remedial racial preference program.4 2, It is
a fair criticism. By definition, the employment of a racial preference in
admissions means that some applicants, who would not otherwise be
admitted, are being admitted because of their race.422 They may be as
well qualified to fill the position as competing applicants, or they may not.
Much will depend upon the nature of the applicant pool and the degree of
the preference.4 23 An institution which pursues a policy of racial diversity,
no matter what the cost, may well favor applicants who are significantly less
qualified, at least by any form of objective measurement.42" On the other
hand, if an institution faithfully followed the rather modest plus-in-the-file
approach sketched by Justice Powell in Bakke,425 race might be little more
than a strong tie breaker among a pool of relatively equally qualified
applicants.
Most racial preference programs are operated in complete secrecy,
making it easy for the public to assume whatever it wants about the degree
and impact of the preferences.426 In this context, the potential for stigma-
tization is certainly present. Some members of non-preferred racial groups
will assume that all minority students are the beneficiaries of affirmative
action and are significantly less qualified, when neither is the case.427
Some minorities who were not the beneficiaries of affirmative action will
feel stigmatized and assume, perhaps correctly, that non-minorities question
their qualifications.4 8 Many members of racial minority groups will not
know whether or not they were beneficiaries of racial preferences but may
419. See infra Part V.
420. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 947 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581
(1996). The court noted that several minority students testified that they felt that other students assumed
they were admitted only because of a racial preference. See id. at 953 n.45.
421. See EASTLAND, supra note 34, at 85-86; STEPHEN CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 50 (1991); Brest & Oshige, supra note 389, at 858; Lino A. Graglia, Race
Norming in Law School Admissions, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 97, 101 (1992); Collier, supra note 402, at 572.
422. See Collier, supra note 402, at 560-63.
423. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 389, at 856-57.
424. See Collier, supra note 402, at 560-63.
425. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-20.
426. See Browne supra note 18, at 1291; Graglia, supra note 18, at 1218.
427. See EASTLAND, supra note 34, at 85-86.
428. See id. at 85.
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suspect that they were, and those suspicions may undermine their self-
confidence.429 Thus, the problem of stigma is very real and must be taken
seriously.
In Bakke, Justice Powell seemed to assume that a competitive
consideration of race as one of many factors would minimize, if not
eliminate, the problem of stigma.43 Strict scrutiny of the program would
ensure that it was in fact a good faith competitive process rather than a
concealed racial quota. If race is accorded little, if any, more weight in the
admissions process than geographic diversity, economic hardship, special
talent, relationship to alumni, or work experience, then presumably the
beneficiaries of racial preferences should be subject to no greater stigma
than the beneficiaries of any of these other relatively well-accepted
preferences. An admissions process which complied with the letter and
spirit of Justice Powell's diversity justification in Bakke would go a long
way toward minimizing stigma.
Stigma is a matter of perception however. In order to minimize it, the
public must be in a position to evaluate the process.43' A secretive
admissions process in which race is taken into account may inevitably lead
to suspicion, misunderstanding, and stigma.432 The price of minimizing
stigma then may be the operation of an honest, open, and publicly
comprehensible admissions process. Though it would not be appropriate,
or even legal, for a university to reveal the test scores and grade points of
individual applicants, it could certainly make public the gross statistics and
any objectively weighted factors, as was done in the context of the litigation
in Hopwood.433 This publicity might eliminate stigma attributable to
erroneous perceptions of racially based disparities. However, stigma
attributable to real differences in qualifications might be even more
pronounced if the disparities were more visible. Presumably, the potential
for increasing stigma and resentment, not to mention litigation, through the
open publication of admissions data would provide a powerful check against
abuse by admissions officials. An institution which chose to employ racial
preferences to override extreme disparities in the academic indicators of
applicants should understand that its procedures are likely to be counterpro-
ductive and would inevitably create stigma and racial polarization.434
Moreover, the institution should also understand that these preferences will
be highly vulnerable to judicial challenge as implicit set-asides.43
429. See id.
430. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318.
431. See Graglia, supra note 421, at 1218.
432. See EASTLAND, supra note 34, at 84-87.
433. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935-38.
434. See EASTLAND, supra note 34, at 84-87.
435. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20.
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Even making gross statistics and other objectively weighted factors
available will not eliminate the problem of stigma with respect to a minority
student who is admitted without the aid of racial preferences.436 As long
as the racial preference is only one of many relatively equally weighted
diversifying factors, the stigma should be no greater than that which might
be borne by an athlete or legacy who was admitted without the benefit of
any preference. Any preferences would remain troublesome, but arguably
not troublesome enough to justify rejection of any utilization of race as a
diversifying factor. It must be emphasized, however, that this would be the
case if and only if the public understood that racial preferences were being
used in a fairly modest way.
A proponent of a strict colorblind approach might argue that any non-
remedial use of race, no matter how modest, would inevitably lead to the
type of stigmatic harm that equal protection is intended to eliminate. The
approach is clear, certain, and cannot be definitively refuted. It may well
be true that minority students who benefit, as well as those minority students
who do not benefit, from racial preferences have the potential of being
harmed by race-conscious decision making. A strict colorblind approach
avoids that possibility by refusing to recognize the validity of the competing
consideration of pursuing racial diversity in the face of racially correlated
disparities in qualifications. Ultimately, the issue boils down to a constitu-
tional value judgment.
The Hopwood majority essentially concluded that the risk of stigma is
inevitable and simply too great of a price to pay.437 This strict colorblind
approach is consistent with the rigorous approach to equal protection
employed by Justice Scalia.4 38  Requiring a publicly open admissions
process, policed by meaningful strict scrutiny, does not eliminate the risk of
stigma, but attempts to contain it. This approach is consistent with Justice
Powell's approach in Bakke, and is not presently inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's equal protection principles.439
c. The Risk of Enduring Racialism
The Hopwood majority also contended that "the use of race to achieve
diversity undercuts the ultimate goal of the Fourteenth Amendment: the end
of racially-motivated state action. Justice Powell's conception of race as a
'plus' factor would always allow race to be a potential factor in admissions
decisionmaking."44 °
436. See City of Richmond v. L.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 517 (1989).
437. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 953.
438. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring).
439. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269.
440. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 947-48 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
[Vol. 29:1
THE FUTURE OF DIVERSITY JUSTIFICATION
The Fifth Circuit noted that Justice Blackmun, concurring and
dissenting in Bakke, emphasized that present race consciousness was,
unfortunately, a necessary prerequisite to the ultimate achievement of a race-
neutral society.44 However, the Hopwood majority, quoting from Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion in Croson, where she expressed concern that
the Croson dissent's call for an intermediate standard of review would lead
to a permanent state of race consciousness, opined that the Supreme Court
had abandoned this position.442 Some would argue that race consciousness
will always be a part of our society and the goal of colorblindness is nothing
short of utopian.443 However, the Fifth Circuit is correct in concluding a
solid majority of the Supreme Court favors an approach to equal protection
which directs the law toward an ideal of governmental colorblindness in the
future.4" Consequently, a practice which has the potential to perpetuate
enduring government sanctioned racialism will be perceived as being in
serious tension with the purpose of equal protection. A majority of the
Justices, if not a majority of the Court, have indicated that a continuing
focus on race by the state tends to perpetuate the evils, such as unfairness,
inaccurate stereotyping, stigmatization, resentment, and conflict, associated
with racial discrimination.445
A logical stopping point for the remedial use of racial preferences is
when the violation has been cured. However, the use of racial preferences
to achieve diversity in educational institutions could continue as long as
racially correlated disparities in academic indicators persist and race
continues to influence life experience.446 There is every reason to assume
these conditions will be present into the foreseeable future. A primary
response to the concern over the potentially indefinite duration of racial
preferences to achieve diversity is Justice Blackmun's argument that racial
preferences are a way-station on the road to a colorblind society, but it may
take an extremely long time to reach that ultimate destination.447  The
441. See id.; Ely, supra note 59, at 723.
442. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948 (quoting City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 495 (1989) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion)). The quotation reads: -lThe dissent's watered-down
version of equal protection review effectively assures that race will always be relevant in American life,
and that the 'ultimate goal' of 'eliminat[ing] entirely from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant
factors as a human being's race .... will never be achieved.' " Id.
443. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM
(1992); RICHARD DELGADO, RODERIGO CHRONICLES 24-28, 74-81, 148-63 (1995).
444. See Paul Mishkin, Forward: The Making of a Turning Point-Metro and Adarand, 84 CAL.
L. REV. 875 (1996).
445. See supra Part lII.B.l-5.
446. In Metro Broadcasting, Justice Brennan tried to defuse criticism of the program at issue in
that case, noting that, like the Harvard plan in Bakke, there would be no further need for the program
once sufficient diversity is achieved. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. Bakke, 497 U.S. 547, 596 (1990).
447. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,403 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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imposition of a colorblind principle on a color conscious society can be
criticized as indifferent to historical and social context." 8
The Hopwood majority quoted Professor Van Alstyne's ringing retort
to this argument:
One gets beyond racism by getting beyond it now: by a complete,
resolute, and credible commitment never to tolerate in one's own life-or
in the life or practices of one's government-the differential treatment of
other human beings by race. Indeed that is the great lesson for govem-
ment itself to teach .. .
This position can be defended both as a matter of principle and pragmatism.
The principle that racially based government action is wrong and harmful,
regardless of the motives or the intended beneficiaries, is clear, simple, and
carries great rhetorical force. The racially based governmental action builds
on the proposition recognized by the Supreme Court that any employment
of racial preference is readily subject to abuse, capable of inflicting harm,
and is easily misunderstood. 40 The longer racial preferences are utilized,
the greater the risk of abuse, harm, and misunderstanding becomes. The
"colorblindness now" position can readily place the proponents of racial
preferences on the defensive by drawing on a wealth of historically based
discomfort with the official employment of racial classifications.
This position recognizes that racial preferences for supposedly benign
purposes can become self-fulfilling prophecies. If members of minority
groups receive valuable preferences on the presumption their experiences
have been affected by race, there will be some incentive to ensure their
experiences continue to be so affected. Thus, rewarding race consciousness
may encourage more race consciousness.45' Moreover, as with any
government entitlement, the interest groups benefitted will have an
understandable incentive to press for the continuation of the program. At
some point, as Professor Farber has noted, racial preferences to achieve
diversity may begin to appear as part of the natural order of things. 452 In
448. The point was well made in Bakke by Justice Marshall, see Bakke, 438 U.S. at 388
(Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part), and Justice Blackmun, see id.
at 403 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). See Richard Delgado,
Roderigo's Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative Action, 83 GEO. L.J. 1711, 1718 (1995).
449. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948 n.35 (quoting William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the
Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 809-10 (1979)).
450. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995); City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492-95 (1989).
451. See SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN
AMERICA 118, 142 (1990).
452. See Jim Chen, Embryonic Thoughts on Rural Identity as New Property, 68 U. COLO. L.
REv. 1123, 1155 (1997); Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate Over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L.
REv. 893, 917 (1994).
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this case, racial preferences become more difficult to eliminate. "
Seemingly endless racial preferences may lead to greater resentment and
may stigmatize intended beneficiaries more severely than temporary racial
preferences. At some point, semi-permanent racial preferences may begin
to appear as little more than a politically extracted benefit for an undeserv-
ing and non-competitive group.454
Thus, the Hopwood court is correct in recognizing that the potentially
indefinite duration of diversity-based racial preferences is in "tension" with
the long term colorblind goals of the Supreme Court's equal protection
jurisprudence. 5 There is no basis for concluding that the Supreme Court
has formulated a principle that, independent of strict scrutiny, racial
preferences of relatively indefinite duration are necessarily inconsistent with
equal protection. The Hopwood court was unable to cite any solid support
for such a principle.456 The court of appeals acknowledged that, if Bakke
is in fact still good law, long enduring racial preferences are constitutionally
acceptable.4" Virtually all of the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court,
as well as by individual Justices, regarding the indefinite duration of racial
preferences have occurred in the context of remedial programs.45 The
emphasis on duration, in the context of remedial programs, is distinguishable
from diversity in education to the extent that it is necessary to limit the
duration of the remedy in order to tailor it to the scope of the wrong. To
the extent the Court was concerned with the burdens imposed on non-
minorities and the divisiveness caused by indefinitely extended racial
preferences, the diversity rationale is implicated.
Justice Scalia favors the type of hard line colorblind approach adopted
by the Hopwood court; however, he has never garnered a majority.45 9
Beyond the remedial context, Justice O'Connor's Metro Broadcasting
dissent criticized the majority's diversity rationale in that case on the ground
that it would support the use of racial preferences indefinitely.46 Justice
O'Connor argued diversity of viewpoint in broadcasting is not a compelling
state interest. 46' This is similar to the argument advanced by the Hopwood
majority.462 If Justice O'Connor were to stand by the views she announced
453. See id.
454. See David A. Strauss, Affirmative Action and the Public Interest, 1995 Sup. CT. REV. 1,
24-25.
455. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948.
456. See id. at 932-55.
457. See id. at 948.
458. See supra Part III.B.3-4 (discussing Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)).
459. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring); Croson, 488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
460. See Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 614.
461. See id.
462. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945.
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in Metro Broadcasting in a majority opinion addressing diversity in
education, the Hopwood court would be a reliable prophet, but that has not
yet occurred.
Thus, Hopwood is incorrect in its assertion that the risk of enduring
racialism necessarily precludes diversity in education from qualifying as a
compelling state interest.463 The Hopwood court is correct, however, in
recognizing that the risk of enduring racialism is a concern that would be
taken very seriously by the present Supreme Court. As the law stands, the
Court will apply strict scrutiny to racial preferences intended to achieve
diversity. The seemingly indefinite duration of such preferences might
cause the Court to question whether, in a particular case, they are narrowly
tailored enough to the compelling interest.
This is a point on which the political process can provide a better check
than judicial review. Public support for racial preferences is clearly
waning.4 ' At some point, which may not be very far away, public
dissatisfaction with enduring racial preferences which seek diversity may
lead to the legislative demise of such preferences quite apart from Hopwood
and equal protection principles.
D. Do Educational Institutions Have a Legitimate Reliance Interest in
Justice Powell's Diversity Justification?
The Hopwood majority contended racial diversity in education is not
a compelling state interest because the Powell opinion in Bakke never
commanded a majority, Bakke has been undermined by subsequent
precedent, and Bakke is inconsistent with equal protection principles.46
If any of these propositions is correct, it would be worth considering
whether educational institutions have acquired a reliance interest in Justice
Powell's diversity approach.
While there may not be any completely reliable information, there
seems to be a consensus that a great many educational institutions, including
most elite institutions, have purported to rely on Justice Powell's discussion
of the Harvard plan as a model for designing constitutionally permissible
admissions processes. Is nineteen years of relatively open reliance on the
463. See id. at 946.
464. See Lemann, supra note 43, at 54; Browne, supra note 18, at 1291; Jayne Noble Suhler,
58% Back Ruling on Race College Entrance, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Nov. 16, 1997 at 45A (A poll
indicated that 58% of Texans agree with the ruling in Hopwood while only 29% oppose it.); Sam Howe
Verhovek, In a Poll, Americans Reject Means But Not Ends of Racial Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,
1997, at AI (A minority of Americans support racial diversity in education but oppose the use of racial
preferences.). But see Sam Howe Verhovek, The 1997 Elections: Houston Voters Turn Back Affirmative
Action Ban Much Like the One in California, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1997, at A24 (Voters in Houston
rejected a ban on affirmative action in city hiring and contracting.).
465. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, i 16 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
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Powell opinion sufficient to insulate these programs from challenge even if
the Powell opinion never commanded a majority?
Hopwood has been criticized as an exercise in illegitimate anticipatory
overruling.466 That would seem to be a fair criticism if the Hopwood
majority's rejection of Bakke relied only on the conclusion that the Powell
opinion is inconsistent with subsequent Supreme Court precedent and equal
protection principles. Hopwood is arguably incorrect with respect to both
of these conclusions, but even if it is correct, these inconsistencies are not
so obvious as to warrant anticipatory overruling by a circuit court. Rather,
as Judge Wiener noted in his concurrence, the majority had to extend
existing Supreme Court precedent beyond its present limits to reach its
conclusion.467 This is important to the ultimate outcome of the Hopwood
case itself, but not necessarily to the future of the diversity justification.
Inevitably, the Supreme Court will confront this issue and have the clear
authority to overrule its own precedent.
However, Hopwood cannot simply be dismissed as an illegitimate
example of anticipatory overruling. The Hopwood majority's first argument
against Bakke, and quite possibly its strongest, was that the Powell opinion
had never commanded a majority of the Supreme Court.46' If this is the
case, there was nothing to be overruled. The Fifth Circuit has simply
pointed out that the emperor has never worn any clothes.
Without repeating the prior analysis of the Powell opinion's preceden-
tial status, recall that Justice Powell's opinion presented all but unsoluable
ambiguities.469 Five Justices agreed race could be a factor in a competi-
tive admissions process, but a majority could not agree when or why race
could be a factor.4 " Universities will seize on the official holding of
Bakke to defend race-conscious admissions decisions; however, they may
not be able to claim that diversity is a compelling state interest or that the
Harvard plan was blessed by anyone other than Justice Powell.
Most institutions presumably read Bakke to mean the Court will permit
an institution to use race as one factor in the admissions process to achieve
a diverse student body as long as there are no quotas or set-asides and as
long as there are meaningful comparisons of applicants across racial
466. See Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720, 721-24 (5th Cir. 1967) (Politz, C.J., dissenting);
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 964 (5th Cir.) (Weiner, J., concurring), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581
(1996). The Supreme Court has held that lower courts should follow controlling Supreme Court
precedent even when the rationale supporting the authority has been rejected by other lines of Supreme
Court authority. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
467. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 964 (Wiener, J., concurring).
468. See id. at 944.
469. See supra Part IV.A.
470. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315-19 (1978); id. at 362-69
(Brennan, I., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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lines."7 Bakke has been read as if the Powell opinion itself was the
majority opinion. As noted earlier, this is a permissible reading, but it is
certainly open to serious challenge.472
Educational institutions which have treated the Powell opinion as a
majority opinion may have assumed that the Court implicitly suggested that
the Powell approach could safely be followed. Indeed, Justice Powell rather
explicitly set forth the Harvard plan for the purpose of providing guid-
ance.473 Such an interpretation by universities is certainly self-serving
since diversity is a relatively easy and comfortable rationale for most
institutions to adopt in order to justify racial preferences.474 However,
such a reading is fraught with risk. The Powell opinion does not purport to
be the opinion of the Court with the exception of one very ambiguous
paragraph. 4" It is scarcely radical to suggest that interpreters of the
opinion should rely on what the Court in fact said, as opposed to what they
would like to infer.
Some commentators have suggested that Bakke sent the cynical
message that institutions could do whatever they wanted with regard to
racial preferences as long as they concealed it from the public. 476 As long
as institutions did not employ explicit quotas, the Court would take no
interest in their affirmative action programs, even if they failed to employ
a truly competitive process. This type of disingenuous reading may have
lead to the abuses by the University of Texas Law School as revealed in the
Hopwood litigation. 477  There is no legitimate legal support for such a
reading.
Arguably, institutions which read Bakke liberally may have concluded
it was apparent that the Brennan four were more disposed to racial
preferences than Justice Powell. While refusing to accede to the Powell
approach in Bakke, if push came to shove, the Brennan four would surely
accept an unqualified diversity rationale if it was necessary to save
471. See Amar & Katyal, supra note 15, at 1751.
472. See supra Part IV.A.
473. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-24.
474. See Volokh, supra note 287, at 2059.
475. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 325-26 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
476. See Lino H. Graglia, Hopwood v. Texas: Racial Preferences in Higher Education Upheld
and Endorsed, 45 J. LEGAL EDuc. 79, 86-87 (1995); see also Greenawalt, supra note 369, at 129
("[Ulniversities would continue pretty much as in the past,... not really reacting conscientiously to
Justice Powell's standards but able to state a justification in those terms."); SCHWARTZ, supra note 15,
at 156 ("[Tihe post-Bakke situation is .... not very different from what it was before the Supreme Court
decision. Minority admissions are still treated as special and universities continue to accord racial
preferences to ensure minority students constitute a significant portion of those enrolled."). But see
Blasi, supra note 56, at 59-60 (rejecting such a reading).
477. See Graglia,supra note 476, at 86-87; Aldave, supra note 17, at3. Dean Aldave describes
how she resigned from the University of Texas Law School's Admissions Committee when it adopted
approaches which clearly seemed to violate Bakke. See Aldave, supra note 17, at 3.
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affirmative action. However, Bakke would seem to be the very case in
which push came to shove and the Brennan four declined to yield.
Alternatively, institutions may have concluded Justice Brennan was
only one vote away from a majority while Justice Powell needed four. If
a new justice agreed with Justice Brennan, then diversity would become
irrelevant and institutions could use racial preferences, including outright
set-asides, to remedy societal discrimination, checked only by a relatively
friendly, intermediate standard of review. At the time, some institutions
may have concluded it was worth gambling that the Brennan four would
find the crucial fifth vote. If so, that gamble has not paid off.
Thus, there are a number of readings of Bakke which might lead a
university to conclude it was relatively safe to rely on the Powell opinion.
However, under any of these interpretations, the conscientious reader must
ultimately concede that none of the justices in Bakke other than Justice
Powell ever asserted that educational diversity constituted a compelling state
interest. Thus, no matter how many institutions have purported to rely on
the Powell opinion, and no matter how long they have continued to do so,
the risk that such reliance is unwarranted remains.
Should such a widespread, open, uncorrected interpretation, even if it
is, in fact, based on a misinterpretation, create a reliance interest worthy of
respect? One obvious response to any claim of reliance on the Powell
opinion is it simply was not reasonable, given it is clear from the face of the
opinion that the Powell diversity approach does not command a majori-
ty.478 Institutions that have relied on the Powell opinion might respond
that a majority of the Court did hold race was a permissible factor to use in
the admissions process. Yet, an inability to rely on the Powell opinion
47would effectively preclude this response.  It should hardly be unreason-
able to construe Bakke in such a way as to prevent the central holding from
being ineffectual. This argument carries some force.
Still, the Justices, rather than the interpreter, are primarily responsible
for the apparent deadlock. Had the Brennan four desired to provide a clear
safe harbor for academic institutions, they could have done so easily by
saying: "Although we believe that a remedial approach is preferable, we
agree with Justice Powell that diversity is a compelling state interest capable
of supporting the use of racial preferences in the admissions process."
Instead, they insisted that even a plus-in-the-file approach was permissible
only as a remedy for past discrimination .4' The Brennan Four apparently
favored doctrinal fidelity over clarity and guidance.
478. See generally Bakke, 438 U.S. at 325 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (stating that no single opinion spoke for the court).
479. See Amar & Katyal, supra note 15, at 1769 n.i 17.
480. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
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Perhaps even more significantly, the Stevens four went out of their way
to caution the reader that "the question whether race can ever be used as a
factor in an admissions decision is not an issue in this case, and that
discussion of that issue is inappropriate.""4 ' Thus, the Stevens four
highlighted the fact that Justice Powell's discussion of the Harvard plan was
gratuitous dicta and, presumably, should not be relied upon.4 2
Until Croson"3 and Adarand,8 4 if not Hopwood itself, there was
no judicial suggestion beyond Bakke that the academic world's working
interpretation of Bakke was misguided. The Court may have recognized, as
any interested observer would, that universities were treating diversity and
the Harvard plan as if they carried a constitutional seal of approval. Should
such a practice eventually become self-validating? One obvious answer to
such reliance on judicial silence is that the Court is not constitutionally
capable of initiating proceedings to correct public misunderstandings of its
work product. Rather, it must wait until an appropriate justiciable case is
presented. 85 That simply did not happen prior to Hopwood, and still has
not. Thus, the risk of misguided reliance is simply a cost of an incremental
system of adjudication. The courts cannot allow private actors to preempt
constitutional interpretation by willfully or innocently overreading prece-
dents.
While the Court itself cannot initiate its own litigation, it does have
ways of addressing issues which are not presently before it. For instance,
when it appeared that lower courts were misinterpreting the breadth of the
Court's holding in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale48 6 with respect to the
propriety of closing pretrial and trial proceedings in criminal cases, several
Supreme Court Justices addressed the issue publicly.8" Moreover,
although the Court was not confronted with any educational admissions
cases since Bakke, it has decided a number of employment and contracting
cases in which it was confronted with the affirmative action issue.4 8 Had
the Court been concerned that educational institutions were misreading
Bakke, it could have dropped a footnote stating the educational area was
quite unclear because the Powell opinion did not represent a majority of the
481. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 411 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
482. See id.
483. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
484. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
485. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911).
486. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
487. See Linda Greenhouse, Stevens Says Closed Trials May Justify New Laws, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 9, 1979, at 41; Linda Greenhouse, The Open Disarray of Closed Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,
1979, at 18; Linda Greenhouse, Powell Says Court Has No Hostility Toward Press, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
14, 1979, at A13.
488. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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Court. This of course would have been attacked, perhaps quite legitimately,
as wholly inappropriate dicta, but it would have put the educational
community on notice that it was precarious to rely on the diversity
justification or the Harvard plan. Given that the Court created the problem
by its inability to agree on much in Bakke, perhaps it was under an
obligation to use whatever means it had available to provide some degree
of warning if the segment of society most affected by the decision appeared
to be misinterpreting it. This assumes the Court is paying attention to what
universities are doing after Bakke, and perhaps such an assumption is
unwarranted.
It may be argued this lengthy, widespread,. and unchallenged reliance
on the Powell opinion, though perhaps self-serving, is entitled to some
respect. Exactly how much respect this reliance deserves should turn to
some extent on the degree of dislocation that a rejection of Justice Powell's
diversity justification would cause, both to the institutions and to their
constituencies. No amount of reasonable reliance should prevent the
correction of a rule which has been misinterpreted if the change will cause
little harm.
A rejection of the Powell diversity approach could result in several
different types of harm. Redesigning admissions procedures itself could
cause expense and inconvenience to the schools." 9 A prohibition of racial
preferences could result in a significant decrease in minority enrollment.90
This in turn could lead to social turmoil and demoralization of minority
students. 9 ' It has been alleged that if the diversity rationale of Bakke is
indeed rejected, most universities and professional schools in the country
will be required to significantly alter their admissions procedures.49 Thus,
the breadth of the reliance on the Powell opinion may seem impressive.
Forcing hundreds, if not thousands, of schools to revise their proce-
dures may seem daunting. Yet, it is hardly apparent why requiring schools
to cease using race as a factor in the admissions process should be
particularly burdensome. Most, if not all, schools presumably review and
fine tune their admissions procedures on a regular basis." Applicant
pools change, test score scaling changes, availability of financial aid
489. These observations reflect in part my own past experience serving on and serving as
chairman of the admissions committee at the SMU School of Law.
490. See Linda Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis
of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admissions Decisions, 72 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1, 51-52 (1997); Deirdre Shesgreen, Schools Look at the 'Whole Person', LEGAL TIMEs, Jan.
13, 1997, at 2.
491. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 389, at 858; Deborah Malamud, Values, Symbols and Facts
in the Affirmative Action Debate, 95 MiCH. L. REV. 1668, 1713 (1997) (Race has become the constitutive
issue for blacks like abortion is for feminists.).
492. See supra note 489.
493. See supra note 489.
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changes, projected class size varies.494 Procedures are reviewed as new
deans and administrators are hired and new faculty join admissions commit-
tees.49  The admissions process is a dynamic constantly evolving enter-
prise." Quite apart from the courts, political controversy over racial
preferences has no doubt forced many schools to rethink their approaches
to the use of racial preferences. There is little reason why compliance with
the rejection of diversity as a compelling state interest could not fit
comfortably within this ongoing revision of procedures.
Most institutions presently relying on racial preferences would no doubt
like to continue to attract a racially diverse student body through permissible
means, such as increasing recruitment efforts, focusing on socioeconomic
background, or building an institution particularly attractive to minority
students. These approaches will require time and effort; however, they tend
to be strategies many schools have already been pursuing to some de-
gree.497 What is required then is not necessarily a radical restructuring of
admissions procedures, as much as a significant shift in emphasis. While
the status quo tends to be comfortable, it should not necessarily be viewed
as an entitlement.
Universities may protest that they, as well as society at large, have
come to rely on the results of the Powell approach-a larger enrollment of
minority students and a more experientially diverse student body. A
rejection of diversity as a compelling state interest could significantly
diminish these achievements, leading to both educational and societal
harm.49 If true, this is a crucial issue for consideration, and may counsel
strongly against significant change. To a large extent, the institutional
interest in maintaining the present level of racial diversity is simply a
repackaging of the argument on the merits that a competitive racial
preference diversity program is indeed a compelling state interest, as
discussed earlier in this paper.4
There is certainly room to question how severely a race-neutral
,admissions process would reduce minority enrollment nationwide.
Arguably, because of the smaller minority applicant pool, the elimination of
racial preferences would redistribute minority students down the educational
hierarchy, but might not significantly reduce the total number of minority
494. See supra note 489.
495. See supra note 489.
496. See supra note 489.
497. See supra note 489.
498. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 389, at 858; Wightman, supra note 490, at A26; Shesgreen,
supra note 490, at 2.
499. See supra Part IVA.
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students enrolled.100 Elite institutions would be hit particularly hard.5°'
Less elite institutions might actually benefit by increasing the effective size
of their minority applicant pool. If so, it is not obvious that the harm is
devastating. The educational process at elite institutions might suffer from
a lack of racial diversity."0 2 However, the cure is readily within the
control of the institutions themselves. If schools have a sufficient commit-
ment to racial diversity, they can simply become less elite in their overall
selection process. If it is appropriate to lower admissions criteria for
minority students, it is not apparent why it would be catastrophic to adjust
criteria downward for non-minority students as well. It may be painful for
elite institutions to have to choose between racial diversity and academic
elitism, but that may simply be the choice that Bakke, properly understood,
poses.
Minority students who would have benefitted from racial preferences
would suffer to some extent by being deprived of the education, prestige,
and opportunities that elite institutions offer.5"3 This is a loss that should
be taken into account; however, some determination should be made as to
how much worse off these students would be with an education and degree
from a less elite institution. Arguably, minority students as a whole might
be better off academically if they attended institutions where they were
admitted on a race-neutral competitive basis rather than as a result of
vigorous racial preferences."'
Perhaps the most serious concern about abandoning racial preferences
in admissions would be that it would send a demoralizing message to
minority communities. Such a message might convey to minorities that the
doors of higher education are no longer open, or at least not as open, as
they have been over the past several years. This is indeed a consideration
that should be taken seriously. The prospect of admission at a leading
university, or professional school, may be a significant motivating factor for
500. See EASTLAND, supra note 34, at 156. Studies by Professor Wightman suggest that this
might not be the case and that many minority students who presently are admitted would not get into
any institution, or at least any institution they could afford to attend if racial preferences were prohibited.
See Wightman, supra note 490, at 18-20. This is troubling, and lends support to an approach which
would permit the employment of moderate racial preferences. It should be noted, however, that
Professor Wightman's conclusions are based on assumptions about how universities, professional schools,
and applicants would behave under a very different set of legal rules than those currently in effect in
most of the country. Furthermore, no one can be certain that in a world without racial preferences,
admissions officers would not be able to find other means to maintain racial diversity, or that minority
applicants might not choose to attend institutions which they otherwise would not. See id. at 18-25.
501. See Brest& Oshige, supra note 389, at 858; Kennedy, supra note 36, at 1329; Graglia supra
note 476, at 82.
502. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 389, at 862-65.
503. Wightman, supra note 490, at 26.
504. See Stuart Taylor, Ducking Hopwood: The Passive Virtues, LEGAL TIMES, July 8, 1996,
at 21; Scanlon, supra note 43, at 356-57.
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minority students. Moreover, the presence of a significant number of
minority students at most institutions of higher learning may send the
message that members of minority groups have a stake in the system, as
well as access to opportunities. 5 ' If the rejection of the diversity justifica-
tion resulted in a significant decrease in the number of minority students in
higher education across the board, a strong argument could be made that the
reliance interest in the present system was too strong to be overcome. If,
on the other hand, the rejection of Bakke leads merely to a redistribution of
minority students down the educational pecking order, the societal harm
might be cognizable but hardly unbearable.
In evaluating the reliance interest in Bakke, it is important to focus on
those benefits achieved through a fair application of Justice Powell's "race
as a competitive factor" approach.'" Such an approach, as opposed to
those which were improperly achieved through the use of quotas, set-asides,
separate admission committees, or separate criteria, allows race to be
considered as a factor only.
Even if Hopwood is correct in its conclusion that Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke never achieved a majority, 50 7 a decent argument can be
made that widespread unchallenged reliance on Powell's opinion, by many
if not most, universities is entitled to some consideration. Whether it would
be enough to insulate Justice Powell's opinion from rejection depends, in
part, upon predictions about the overall impact of such a change.
If Hopwood is incorrect in concluding that the Powell opinion never
commanded a majority, the reasonableness of the reliance interest increases
substantially, perhaps to a degree which would effectively preclude the
possibility it will be overruled. In addition, if the Supreme Court were to
consider overruling Bakke on the other grounds relied upon in Hop-
wood--that Bakke has been undermined by subsequent precedent and that
it is inconsistent with the equal protection principles'°S-factors in addition
to reasonable reliance must be considered.
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the joint opinion of Justices
O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy engaged in a comprehensive discussion of
stare decisis.5"9 The Court concluded that, in addition to reliance interests,
when determining whether a precedent should be overruled, the Court may
consider whether the rule has become unworkable, whether it has been
undermined by subsequent precedent, and whether it is based on faulty
505. See, e.g., Lemann, supra note 43, at 54; Sandalow, supra note 82, at 688-89; Paul
Carrington, Diversity!, 1992 UTAH L. REv. 1105, 1152.
506. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978).
507. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
508. See id. at 94448.
509. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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factual premises.5 ' None of these factors point in favor of overruling the
Powell opinion in Bakke.
It would be impossible to determine that the judicial principles
expounded by Justice Powell have become unworkable since, prior to
Hopwood, they have not been the subject of legal challenge. Certainly the
principle that racial classifications should be strictly scrutinized has carried
the day and is applied regularly by the Court.5 ' However, there is hardly
sufficient judicial consideration of Justice Powell's distinction between a
plus-in-the-file and a set-aside to conclude that it is not a judicially
manageable standard. Although there is no actual judicial support for this
position, Justice Brennan in Bakke and some commentators, have contended
it would be difficult to determine whether an institution was employing an
implicit quota or set-aside."'
Hopwood found that the Powell opinion in Bakke has been undermined
by subsequent Supreme Court precedent and is inconsistent with equal
protection principles." 3 I have argued at length earlier that, while there
is some basis for these conclusions, the better argument is to the con-
trary.5"4 If, however, the Supreme Court concludes that Bakke is inconsis-
tent with existing precedent or principle, such consideration would, by
definition, resolve this factor in favor of overruling it.
Finally, there is no basis for concluding that the factual assumptions
underlying the Powell opinion in Bakke have been proven incorrect.
Perhaps the only assumption of any relevance is that race correlates to some
extent with distinctive experience. 5 This is a controversial proposition,
and there are those who reject it."16 However, there are also many who
support it.5 7 The assumption is not easy to establish or to refute empiri-
cally. It is fair to say that there is certainly no body of solid empirical
evidence that rejects it. Thus, the criteria of changed factual assumptions
is largely irrelevant to a decision to overrule.
510. See id.
511. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,212-31, 235-37(1995); Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986).
512. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 378-79 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Graglia, supra note 476, at 87; Chin, supra
note 20, at 936; Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the
Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 926-28 (1983).
513. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944-48.
514. See supra Part IV.B-D.
515. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-18.
516. See EASTLAND, supra note 34, at 80-82; CARTER, supra note 421, at 40; Paulsen, supra note
387, at 1000; Chen, supra note 84, at 1868; Carrington, supra note 505, at 114748.
517. See Amar& Katyal, supra note 15, at 1774-76; Brest& Oshige, supra note 389, at 862-63;
Blasi, supra note 56, at 4345; Sandalow, supra note 82, at 685-86; Note, An Evidentiary Framework
for Diversity as a Compelling Interest in Higher Education, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1357, 1366-73 (19961.
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In addition to these specific considerations, the majority joint opinion
in Casey argued that the Court should be hesitant to overrule a case, such
as Roe v. Wade,5 where it has attempted to resolve an "intensely
divisive controversy" by calling the contending sides to accept "a common
mandate rooted in the Constitution." ' 9 It may be naive to believe that
the Court has the power to end such heated controversies with a judicial
decision. Just as Roe v. Wade certainly did not end the debate over
abortion, Bakke did not end the debate over racial preferences in education.
But if Roe qualifies as such an attempt, then so does Bakke. 2 ° Indeed,
Professor Mishkin wrote a provocative article arguing that Bakke largely
succeeded in this endeavor while Roe failed. 2'
The joint opinion in Casey is hardly the sole authority on stare decisis,
but it provides a recent and thoughtful summary of its principles .
22
Arguably all of the factors cited in Casey support continued adherence to the
Powell opinion in Bakke.523
V. THE FUTURE OF THE DIVERSITY JUSTIFICATION
At least for now, Hopwood has eliminated diversity as an effective
justification for using racial preferences in college and professional school
admissions programs within the Fifth Circuit, or at the very least, has
rendered it a legally risky endeavor. In the future, other circuit courts of
appeals, as well as the Supreme Court, will need to determine whether
Hopwood is correct and should be followed.524 Hopwood's reading of
Bakke as precedent is stronger than Hopwood's critics would care to
acknowledge. Nevertheless, the question is shrouded in all but insoluable
ambiguity and can be definitively resolved only by future Supreme Court
consideration. The Hopwood majority's conclusion that the Powell opinion
has been undermined by subsequent precedent reads more into that
precedent than is warranted.5' Hopwood relies on dicta from cases
involving employment and contracting, which may well be distinguishable
from the educational admissions context.526
518. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
519. Casey, 505 U.S. at 866-67.
520. See Amar & Katyal, supra note i5, at 1770. But see, Kahlenberg, supra note 358, at 1044.
521. See Mishkin, Ambivalence, supra note 512, at 923.
522. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-55.
523. See id. at 866-67.
524. Cases similar to Hopwood have been filed challenging racial preferences employed by the
University of Washington School of Law and by the University of Michigan at the undergraduate level.
Steven Holmes, Major Ruling on Affirmative Action Is Likely Sooner or Later, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 1997, at AIS.
525. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944-45 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. CL 2581
(1996).
526. See id. at 940.
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There is no question that Justice O'Connor's dissent in Metro
Broadcasting is in serious tension with the Powell opinion in Bakke. 27
It is a dissenting opinion, however, and as such is not precedent. Nose
counting suggests that a majority of the Court may agree with that dissent,
especially since Justice O'Connor wrote the subsequent opinion in Adarand
overruling Metro Broadcasting.28 But the question remains whether the
rationale of the Metro Broadcasting dissent extends comfortably to the
educational context. The Hopwood majority also concluded that the Powell
opinion in Bakke was inconsistent with the equal protection principles of
individuality, elimination of stigma, and avoidance of enduring racial-
ism."' There can be some question as to the prominence of these three
principles, but if their validity is accepted, Justice Powell's approach in
Bakke is extremely consistent with the first and largely consistent with the
second. The diversity justification is in tension with the third principle.
Right or wrong, many universities and professional schools have
modelled their admissions programs on the diversity justification set forth
by Justice Powell in Bakke. That reliance is entitled to some respect,
perhaps enough to preclude the rejection of the Powell approach by the
Supreme Court even if it should conclude that Powell's opinion was
incorrect."' 0
Justice Powell's approach in Bakke lacks the rhetorical force and clarity
of the pure colorblind theory; however, its individualistic nature is consistent
with the Court's recent equal protection jurisprudence."3 ' By applying
strict scrutiny, the Powell approach takes the risks of race-conscious
governmental action quite seriously."' If applied honestly, strict scrutiny
should provide adequate protection against abuse. Furthermore, strict
scrutiny does a better job of accommodating the general antidiscrimination
principle with the realities of a racially conscious society than does a purely
colorblind approach. The thesis of the diversity justification is that race
often gives rise to distinctive experience and that the educational process is
significantly enhanced by students with diverse backgrounds."' The fact
that racial diversity is only one of many appropriate diversifying characteris-
tics still holds true and still should be considered a compelling state interest.
In short, I conclude that Justice Powell got it right in Bakke and that his
527. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 546, 614 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
528. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
529. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 943.
530. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992).
531. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
532. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-320 (1978).
533. See supra notes 391-400 and accompanying text.
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approach should be reaffirmed on the merits and not simply on the basis of
stare decisis.
Race consciousness in general and the diversity justification in
university admissions in particular have been subject to escalating challenge
in recent years. Part of this attack is undoubtedly attributable to the belief
that race-conscious government action is counterproductive and that a
colorblind approach is the best way to achieve racial equality.534 But
some of the reaction against the emphasis on diversity in university
admissions is probably attributable to the belief that educational institutions
have abused the Powell approach in an attempt to achieve other goals which
were rejected by Justice Powell, such as racial representation or remediation
for societal discrimination. 35
In Hopwood, the University of Texas did just that.536  Data with
respect to university admissions processes, especially where diversity is
concerned, tends to be a tightly guarded secret. In the past few years,
students at Georgetown and University of Miami law schools have been
disciplined for revealing aggregate data which showed the disparity in
academic credentials between minority and non-minority students.
537
Thus, it is difficult to know, but easy to suspect, that many institutions other
than the University of Texas have employed procedures, criteria, and
purposes inconsistent with the Powell approach in Bakke in the quest for
greater racial diversity. Some institutions may have accorded so much
weight to race that it overrides every other factor, including traditional
indicators of academic potential. 3 This would also violate the Powell
approach 39 since it amounts to an implicit quota, and is not a good faith
effort to operate a competitive admissions process.
As noted above, in Bakke, Justice Brennan suggested that the Powell
diversity approach would result in disingenuous behavior by admissions
officers intent on adopting effective, though clandestine, quotas. 540 Justice
Powell responded that the Court should assume the good faith of institutions
purporting to achieve diversity until there is reason to doubt it.54' The
Hopwood majority opined that "even if a 'plus' system were permissible,
534. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 946-48.
535. See Browne, supra note iS, at 1293-95; Chen, supra note 84, at 1848-50; Chin, supra note
20, at 882-84; Graglia, supra note 421, at 99, 102; Carrington, supra, note 505, at 1106-07; Greenawalt,
supra note 369, at 122; Posner, supra note 387, at 26; SCHWARTZ, supra note 15. at 156.
536. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 936-38.
537. See Graglia, supra note 421, at 97-98; Frances Robles, Conservative Law Student Brings
Furor to Forefront, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 1, 1995, at I B.
538. See Browne, supra note 18, at 1293; Graglia, supra note 18, at 1215; Lemann, supra note
43, at 54.
539. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318-19.
540. See id. at 379 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
541. See id. at 318-19.
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it likely would be impossible to maintain such a system without degenera-
tion into nothing more than a 'quota' program. ' 541 In view of the widely
held perception that many institutions have used diversity as a cover to
achieve racial proportionality, the time has come to doubt that good faith
and insist that institutions pursuing racial diversity develop far more visible
procedures to guarantee the public that the institutions are indeed operating
within the legitimate confines of Bakke.
Presumably, such abuse of the diversity justification could be corrected
through legal challenge and the application of strict scrutiny as in Hop-
wood.143 Perhaps the very existence of Hopwood will cause other univer-
sities outside of the Fifth Circuit to review their admissions policies to
ensure that they are at least consistent with a good faith reading of the
Powell opinion in Bakke.5" But because of the secrecy surrounding the
admissions process, a potential challenger may have difficulty determining
whether there might be abuse and, hence, a basis for litigation. Arguably,
the most effective check on abuse of the diversity justification would be a
requirement that institutions desiring to employ race as a diversifying factor
in a competitive admissions process publish sufficient data about the process
to allow interested and affected constituencies to make an intelligent assess-
ment of what the institution is doing.
The primary point of such publicity would be to provide a political
check. Hopefully, institutions would not stray too far from a good faith
interpretation of Bakke if they could be held accountable to their student
body, the faculty, university counsel, the central administration, the board
of regents and trustees, alumni, potential donors, state legislators, political
groups, the press, and insurance carriers. The publication of such informa-
tion would allow potential plaintiffs to make an informed judgment as to
whether their rights had been violated but, presumably, the primary impact
of publication would be to provide a politically potent incentive for
institutions to comply with the law.
Pursuant to this approach, institutions that choose to employ race as a
diversifying factor should be required to publish the following information.
First, the institution should explain why it considers diversity, and especially
542. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948 n.36. See Lino Graglia, Podberesky, Hopwood, and Adarand:
Implications for the Future of Race Based Programs, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 287, 291 (1996) (arguing
that universities would abuse the use of race in the admissions process).
543. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 940.
544. Discussion by admissions committee members and admissions officers at a recent American
Association of Law Schools Conference on Diversity tends to confirm this assertion. Workshop on
Achieving a Diverse Student Body in a Time of Retrenchment: Rising Controversy and Renewed
Commitment (Jan. 4, 1997) (unpublished workshop booklet of the American Association of Law Schools,
on file with the Texas Tech Law Review). On the other hand, several private law schools in Texas
covered by Title VI are at least considering continuing to rely on Bakke despite Hopwood. See Sylvia
Moreno, Morales' Position Draws Fire, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Feb. 22, 1997, at IA.
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racial diversity, important to its educational mission. Requiring the
institution to prove its case for diversity empirically would probably be too
onerous, although it would greatly bolster its position if the institution could
prove its case. 45 In any event, the institution should provide something
more than boilerplate. The purpose of this requirement would be to ensure
that the institution has put some thought into its adoption of a race-
conscious policy and has not adopted diversity as a convenient cliche behind
which to employ race in an unjustifiable manner. 46 A statement that
attempts to justify a commitment to racial diversity on the basis of the
unique experiences of the institution should be especially worthy of respect.
Obviously, certain technical programs, such as theoretical physics or
veterinary science, might find it more difficult to explain why racial, or for
that matter any, diversity is important to the program's legitimate goals.
47
Second, the institution should also be required to explain how it
purports to achieve diversity. It would be quite misguided to encourage
institutions to adopt an equation or formula for considering diversifying
factors in the admissions process. That would indeed turn the Powell
opinion on its head because one of the Powell opinion's central tenets is
that, when race is a factor, the applicant must be treated as a unique
individual with many potentially relevant characteristics.4 8  Devising a
formula which assigns a particular weight to diversifying characteristics,
including race should not be unconstitutional; however, it would be unduly
limiting. Still, an institution ought to be able to explain which factors it
considers important, and why, and how the institution attempts to balance
these factors in the admissions process. Indeed, an institution might attempt
to create several representative hypothetical files and explain how it would
assess and rank them. This could benefit the institution by forcing it to
focus on its admissions process in a disciplined manner to ensure that it
really is engaged in a good faith effort to comply with the Powell approach
in Bakke. Likewise, requiring an institution to explain its diversity process
would provide some assurance to the public that the institution was living
within the law rather than surreptitiously evading it.
Third, if an institution decides to use race as a diversifying factor, it
should be required to publish aggregate statistics detailing the type of
diversity it has achieved and whether that diversity is based on race,
545. See Note, An Evidentiary Framework for Diversity as a Compelling Interest in Higher
Education, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1357, 1366-73 (1996). But see Chen, supra note 84, at 187 1-72 (arguing
that there is no proof that "command and control diversity" is any more effective at producing a rich
exchange of ideas than race-neutral diversity).
546. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500-01 (1989) ("A governmental
actor cannot render race a legitimate proxy for a particular condition merely by declaring that the
condition exists.").
547. See Amar & Katyal, supra note 15, at 1778.
548. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-18.
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geography, age, gender, educational background, etc. This should be
accompanied by comparative objective criteria, such as average grade point
and standardized test scores for the various groups that have benefitted from
preferences. Such datawould permit the constituencies of the institution to
assess the admissions process and respond positively or negatively. The
institution would need only provide comparative statistics on the basis of
those criteria it considers important." 9 If an institution takes the position
that grades and test scores are significant factors in the admissions process,
then the institution should explain how its reliance on various diversifying
factors causes it to deviate from these criteria. If, however, an institution
abandons reliance on standardized tests or utilizes them only as a minimum
threshold, then it need not provide comparative test score data.
Finally, the institution should publish any data it has accumulated
indicating graduates admitted pursuant to a diversity program perform as
well as, or better than, other graduates in their post-graduate occupa-
tions." o
Justice Brennan was correct in suggesting the Powell approach is not
defensible if it merely intends to achieve political acceptability by allowing
institutions to conceal racial quotas from the public.55" ' The publication
of comparative admissions criteria for the various groups affected by the
admissions process would provide a sorely needed check against such bad
faith manipulation by institutions. Extreme discrepancies between the
academic indicators of different racial groups might lead to the conclusion
that race was not being employed simply as a permissible plus-in-the-file,
but was illegitimately used as the overriding factor in the decisionmaking
process. " 2 Even if the good faith of the institution is not impugned by such
a comparison, it would give the constituencies of the institution the
information necessary to adequately evaluate its admissions practices.
In the section of his Bakke opinion addressing the use of racial
preferences to provide a remedy for past discrimination, Justice Powell
549. See CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE 149 (1996) (concluding that
public visibility, what he called transparency, of affirmative action criteria and procedures is a good
thing, but that its cost may be too high if it is used to undermine the programs).
550. See Ethan Bronner, Colleges LookforAnsuers to Racial Gaps in Testing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
8, 1997, at AI, A8 (summarizing studies suggesting minority students with lower test scores are nearly
as successful after graduation); Ethan Bronner, Study of Doctors Sees Little Effect of Affirmative Action
on Careers, N.Y. TIMES, OcL 8, 1997, at AI (A study of minority doctors admitted under an affirmative
action plan to the Cal-Davis medical school after Bakke indicates that they have been about as successful
as non affirmative action admits.); Richard Delgado, Why Universities Are Morally Obligated to Strive
for Diversity: Restoring the Remedial Rationale for Affirmative Action, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1165, 1171
(1997) (Minority law graduates seem to be as successful as non-minority graduates.).
55 1. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 379 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
552. For the argument that the gross disparities in academic indicators of minorities and non-
minorities is evidence that most institutions engage in race norming, see Chen, supra note 452, at 1150.
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argued it is important that policy choices in the area of racial preferences are
made by politically accountable bodies. 53 The point was well taken. The
use of racial preferences, though sometimesjustifiable, has extreme potential
to be divisive and counterproductive." 4 Some measure of visibility (and
thus, hopefully, political accountability) should help protect against these
dangers.5" The Supreme Court has not held, nor need it hold, that racial
preferences for purposes of creating diversity may be utilized only by a
body that is elected or politically removable. People who have the powerful
insulation of life tenure often establish admissions policies."' There
should be nothing constitutionally improper about this. Rendering the
process more visible to interested parties, however, would, even if only by
the grace of the institution, create a significant check short of constitutional
litigation.
As discussed earlier in the section on stigma, publication of admissions
criteria and aggregate admissions data could be counterproductive to the
diversity enterprise. 5 " Publication would raise uncomfortable questions
about the qualifications of minority students admitted with lower academic
indicators. Also, publication might undermine minority self-esteem and
could contribute to racial polarization on campus." These are very real
concerns; however, they are best viewed as attributable to the underlying
admissions policies themselves rather than their publication." 9 There are
legitimate and serious costs of racial preferences which should be confronted
rather than concealed. There is every reason to be suspicious of a policy
that can be maintained and justified, if and only if, the public does not
understand what is occurring.' Presumably, a publicity requirement
would create strong political and legal incentives to employ only those racial
preferences that are mild enough in context to avoid significant stigmatiza-
tion or polarization. The use of racial preferences as sketched by Justice
Powell in Bakke should be acceptable both as a matter of constitutional law
and as a matter of educational policy, but only if the use of racial preferenc-
es can be defended openly and in good faith. There is no reason why this
553. See id. at 308-09.
554. See supra note 404 and accompanying text.
555. See Sunstein, supra note 299, at 1192-93 (arguing that racial preferences should be the
subject of public debate and deliberation). But see Chin, supra note 20, at 936 (arguing that any use of
race in the admissions process will create an appearance of abuse).
556. See Sunstein, supra note 299, at 1192-93.
557. See supra Part IV.C.3.b.
558. See Derrick A. Bell Jr., Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial
Remedies, 67 CAL. L. REV. 3, 18 (1979).
559. See id. at 14; Deborah Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class,
68 U. CoLO. L. REv. 939, 996 (1997) (Stereotyping based on racial disparities in academic indicators
is now unavoidable since Hopwood widely publicized those disparities.).
560. See Graglia, supra note 421, at 102; Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1781,
1793 (1996).
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cannot occur. However, if the price of honesty is too dear, then racial
preferences deserve the fate they received in Hopwood.
Finally, an institution that employs racial preferences should affirma-
tively review its policies periodically to determine whether the pursuit of
racial diversity, through racial preferences, still serves its mission and
remains worth the social costs.
Perhaps the most serious criticism of the diversity rationale is there is no
stopping point.56 Theoretically, diversity justifies race-conscious admis-
sions indefinitely. If a colorblind society is our long term constitutional goal,
then entrenched racial preferences create serious problems. There may be
no logical stopping point to race-conscious diversity, but if an institution
periodically re-examines its policies, it may well conclude race conscious-
ness no longer serves the institution's purposes or that its policies must at
least be adjusted to reflect changes in social context. A commitment to
good faith, periodic reevaluation may provide some protection against
unthinking acceptance of race-conscious diversity as a permanent and
unchallengeable aspect of the educational landscape.
The O'Connor plurality made a similar point in Croson when it
recognized that proper fact findings of past discrimination as a predicate to
the remedial use of racial preferences:
[S]erve to assure all citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal
treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure
taken in the service of the goal of equality itself. Absent such findings,
there is a danger that a racial classification is merely the product of
unthinking stereotypes or a form of racial politics. 62
Equal protection jurisprudence does not presently compel the publica-
tion of this type of data. However, requiring a relatively open admissions
process can be justified as a prophylactic measure designed to minimize
forms of abuse that violate equal protection. The Court's emphasis on
narrow tailoring of the remedial use of racial preferences lends some support
to such an obligation. In Croson, the plurality approvingly quoted Justice
Stevens' dissent in Fullilove for its recognition that "[b]ecause racial
characteristics so seldom provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment,
and because classifications based on race are potentially so harmful to the
entire body politic, it is especially important that the reasons for any such
classification be clearly identified and unquestionably legitimate." 563
561. See supra Part IV.C.3.c.
562. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 269, 510 (1989).
563. Id. at 505 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 533-35 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)). The call for candor should extend to the judiciary as well. In his dissent in Metro
Broadcasting, Justice Kennedy criticized the majority on this point, noting that
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The publication of relevant data about the use of race in the admissions
process could attempt to meet this concern even short of litigation. Even if
publicizing the admissions process is not constitutionally required, an
institution might conclude that it could render its own diversity program
more politically palatable and less subject to legal challenge by providing
its constituencies with relevant information. That assumes, of course, that
the institution is employing a defensible process. If not, there is little reason
to be sympathetic to the institution's plight.
Whether Justice Powell spoke for a majority or only for himself, his
opinion in Bakke provided a wise and constitutional means of reconciling
the quest for a colorblind society with the reality of a race-conscious one.
Diversity, as a compelling state interest achieved through careful, good faith
competitive evaluation, should stand the test of time. As such, Hopwood
was wrong to reject it. On the other hand, there is every reason to believe
that the diversity justification has been seriously abused by educational
institutions in recent years. The combination of strict scrutiny and publicity
should be sufficient to curb such abuse and put diversity back on track.
Until the Court is candid about the existence of stigma imposed by racial preferences on
both affected classes, candid about the 'animosity and discontent' they create... and open
about defending a theory that explains why the cost of this stigma is worth bearing and why
it can consist with the Constitution, no basis can be shown for today's casual abandonment of
strict scrutiny.
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